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1. Introduction 
Fundamental changes are taking place in the Internet as the traffic amount keeps 
growing and more and more content is being provided. As a result, much research has 
been done in the field of Internet traffic trends. The most recent Cisco Visual 
Networking Index (VNI) whitepaper (Cisco, 2010a) has shown that the traffic and video 
amount in the Internet is growing with an alarming rate and will keep growing in the 
future. 
The increasing traffic amount has led to the consolidation of content sources, i.e. 
large Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) become 
even larger (Labovitz et al., 2009). However, with the concentration of content sources 
also comes scarcity of data centre and network capacity. In addition, the interconnection 
agreements between ISPs become more complicated and the traditional agreement types 
do not apply fully anymore. As a result, the focus has transferred from connectivity to 
contents. 
Information networking is a new network concept that tries to solve the current 
problems in the Internet. The concept introduces routing based on content names instead 
of location of the content (Jacobsen et al., 2009). Three reference architectures have 
been developed based on the concept; Content Centric Networking (CCN) (Jacobsen et 
al., 2009), Publish-Subscribe Internet Architecture (PSIRP) (Fotiou, Polyzos and 
Trossen, 2009) and Networking of Information (NetInf) (Ahlgren and Vercellone, 2010). 
Each of these architectures is being researched in different research projects and the 
Finnish Future Internet project’s work package 3’s main focus is on PSIRP (ICT SHOK 
Future Internet, 2007). 
In the content distribution market, many markets exist where one side of the market 
is charged while the other side is subsidised, such as the CDN (Faratin, 2007), portals 
and media (Rochet and Tirole, 2003) and streaming media technology (Rochet and 
Tirole, 2003). Thus in this work, these kinds of two-sided markets play an important 
role in evaluating the market feasibility of different content distribution models. 
1.1 Research Question and Objectives 
While two-sided markets exist in different industries, they have not been widely 
recognised. Managers and policy makers do not yet distinguish two-sided markets or 
intentionally use two-sided theory for pricing and regulations. However, because two-
sided markets should be regulated and priced differently from one-sided markets, it is 
important to know which markets are two-sided. Drawing value network graphs is an 
easy and clear way to visualise the relationships between each player in a given market. 
Thus the main research questions are as follows: 
What are the possible two-sided markets in Internet content delivery? 
What are the value networks for each technical Internet content 
delivery model? 
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Because this work is done in the Future Internet project, the answers to the main 
research questions are used to analyse information networking. The following 
supplementary question expresses this: 
Where is the market potential for the proposed information 
networking models? 
To obtain the answers for the above questions, the following objectives are set for 
this work: 
 Identify the main stakeholders for each content delivery model: client-
server, CDN and information networking. 
 Identify the traffic transfer between stakeholders. 
 Identify the monetary and non-monetary transfers between stakeholders. 
 Identify costs and pricing faced by Internet service providers (ISPs) and 
content providers (CPs). 
 Identify the two-sided markets of client-server, CDN and information 
networking. 
 Compare each content delivery model with SWOT (strength, weakness, 
opportunity, threat) analysis. 
1.2 Research Scope 
The term Internet content has quite different meanings for different industries and in 
this work it is defined as follows: 
Internet content is the bits and data packets that are distributed in the 
Internet such as video files, a piece of news or an html page. 
In addition, the terms content delivery and content distribution are considered as 
synonyms for each other and used interchangeably. 
Most of the works on two-sided markets have focused on the two sides of 
consumers and service providers, because the focus has been on the services provided 
on the content layer. However, in this work the focus is on the Internet interconnection 
layer and from the CDN’s perspective the ISPs represent the consumers. Thus the two 
sides of the market are the ISPs and the content providers. A short overview of the 
content layer’s two-sided markets is also given. On the other hand, the consumers are 
significant for the content providers and thus the value network analysis will include 
consumers whereas the actual two-sided analysis concentrates only on ISPs and content 
providers as the two sides of the market. 
Several architectures and models for distributing content exist in the Internet, three 
of which will be investigated in this work; the client-server model, CDNs and 
information networking. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is also a prominent model for content 
distribution, but because the focus is not on consumers and the P2P model is not widely 
deployed by content providers (Interviews: CP1, CP2), it is not discussed in this work. 
Out of the three chosen model, the client-server model will only be dealt with briefly as 
the focus is on CDNs and information networking. 
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The feasibility analysis is mainly based on the cost analysis even if the 
investigation concludes in finding other criteria for evaluating feasibility. This is 
because the foundation for two-sided markets is the cost structure of a service or 
industry. The possible other criteria will be discussed very briefly. 
1.3 Research Methods 
In this work, two main research methods are adopted; a literature review and interviews. 
A literature review is used to give a solid background to the two-sided market theory. In 
addition, a literature review is used to build a foundation for the interviews regarding 
the different content distribution models. 
Semi-structured interviews are conducted to discover the advantages and 
disadvantages of the current models used in content distribution. The interviewees are 
divided into three groups; the content providers, the Internet access providers and the 
data centre providers. In addition, the focus is on the costs each group faces when 
distributing contents. The interviews also aim at finding other criteria for evaluating the 
current content distribution models. A list of questions is constructed for each group as 
a guideline to the interviews and is shown in Appendix B. 
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
The structure of this work is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Structure of thesis. 
5. Value Networks of Content Delivery Models 
3. Two-Sided Market Theory 
1. Introduction 
4. Interviews 
6. Content Delivery as Two-sided Markets 
7. Comparison of Content Delivery Models 
8. Conclusion 
2. Background 
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The rest of this work is mainly divided into two parts. The first part consists of the 
background research and starts with Section 2, which describes the technical 
background of the work including the interconnection agreements. Section 3 introduces 
the two-sided market theory and presents the mathematical model to support the theory. 
Section 4 explains the interview procedure and summarises the results obtained from 
interviews. Section 5 introduces the three content delivery models and their costs as 
well as creates each of their value networks. 
Sections 6 and 7 belong to the second part of the thesis, which provides an analysis 
of the different Internet content distribution models. Section 6 identifies the two-sided 
markets in each model and applies two-sided market theories onto them. Section 7 
compares the results obtained in Section 6 and analyses them. 
The final section in the thesis is Section 8 which contains the conclusion and future 
research proposals. In addition, this work has two Appendices; Appendix A gives the 
calculations to prove the two-sided market mathematics and Appendix B lists the 
interview questions. 
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2. Background 
This work includes many economics and technical terms and concepts, which need 
some explaining. This section aims at explaining these concepts for a better 
understanding of the rest of the work. An overview of the Internet interconnectivity 
principles and agreements are first presented. The section then continues with 
explanations of the stakeholders considered in this work as well as discusses the 
different available content distribution models. 
2.1 Internet Interconnection 
Internet interconnection and its policies play an important role in this work. This section 
explains the structure of Internet interconnection along with the transit and peering 
agreements between Internet service providers. 
The Internet (Clark et al., 2008) is a network of networks called Autonomous 
Systems (ASes). These ASes are administered by commercial Internet service providers, 
corporations and other enterprise providers, universities, government agencies as well 
as content providers and other specialized service providers. The ISPs offer Internet 
access to consumers and enterprises for a monetary compensation. In order for the ISPs 
to offer an end-to-end service to the consumers, interconnection between ASes must be 
arranged, which means cooperation between ISPs. Mainly two types of interconnection 
agreements exist in the Internet; the transit and the peering agreements. 
Transit is when the lower level operators buy access to the upstream operator’s 
whole network (Norton, 2010a). This means that transit agreements provide access to 
all the nodes in the upstream operator’s routing table and it is the upstream operator’s 
responsibility to provide connectivity to the whole Internet for the lower level operators. 
Peering (Norton, 2010a), on the other hand, is a bilateral agreement between two 
operators to access each other’s customers. No monetary compensations are paid by 
either of the operators. Peering agreements are not transitive, which means that the 
operators can only access each other’s customers but not the rest of the network. 
A combination of the two interconnection agreements together with the ISPs form 
the simplified Internet hierarchy followed by traditional Internet interconnection and is 
shown in Figure 2. Tier 1 network operators have full-coverage of the Internet (Laffont, 
Marcus, Rey and Tirole, 2003) and do not buy transit services from other network 
providers (Norton, 2010a). Tier 2 network operators are regional and local operators 
that buy the transit service from Tier 1 operators and sell the connection to the 
consumers. 
The traffic stays on-net from an operator’s perspective if it stays within its own 
network. For example, in Figure 2, when traffic is within only one consumer group, it is 
on-net traffic. Off-net traffic, on the other hand, is when traffic traverses to another 
operator’s network. From the figure, traffic between the two groups of consumers is off-
net traffic. Due to the interconnection agreements, on-net and off-net traffic cause 
different costs for operators. 
The originating network means the sender’s network while the terminating network 
is the network where the receiver resides. When the traffic flows from the originating 
network to the upper level operators in the hierarchy it is called upstream traffic. On the 
contrary, downstream traffic is the traffic that flows from the upper level operators to 
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the terminating network. For example, in Figure 2, when a user from consumer group 1 
sends traffic to a user in consumer group 2, the traffic first goes upstream until it 
reaches Tier 1, then it goes downstream to consumer group 2. 
 
The portrayal so far has been the traditional Internet hierarchy. However, with the 
increase of large content sources and the increase of peering traffic, the traditional 
hierarchy no longer applies purely to the current Internet (Labovitz et al., 2009). The 
more complex interconnection relationships mainly include two new interconnection 
types; paid-peering and partial-transit (Clark et al., 2008). 
2.2 Stakeholders 
This section explains the different stakeholders considered in this work and their roles 
in the content distribution market. The stakeholders used in this work are content 
provider, content maker, data centre provider, Internet service provider, Internet access 
provider, Internet backbone provider, CDN, consumer, sponsor, and advertiser. 
 Content provider (CP) has a central database of content and distributes it 
to consumers through different means of content delivery. Mainly three 
types of content providers exist: 
1. Makes own content and distributes it. 
2. Buys content from content makers and distributes it. 
3. Provides a platform for the content makers to distribute their content 
against a small fee or royalty. 
 Content maker makes the content to be distributed. A content maker can 
be a separate actor or operate within the content provider. 
 Data centre provider rents server capacity to anyone who needs it; in this 
case the content provider. 
Figure 2. The simplified Internet interconnection structure. (Shakkottai and Srikant, 2006; Norton, 2003) 
Transit 
Peering Tier 1 
Tier 2 Tier 2 
Consumers 1 Consumers 2 
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 Internet service provider (ISP) offers Internet interconnectivity services 
to clients and in this work an ISP can be divided into: 
1. Internet access provider (IAP) is the local network operator or Tier 
2 operator (Norton, 2010a), which offers Internet connections to 
consumers and content providers. 
2. Internet backbone provider (IBP) is a full coverage network 
provider or Tier 1 provider. 
 Content Delivery Network Provider (CDN) is the actor offering CDN 
services. CDN is an Internet overlay, which offers additional value to the 
basic Internet content delivery. 
 Consumer in this work includes anyone who uses the content offered by 
the content provider. 
 Advertiser and sponsor are revenue sources for the content providers and 
content makers. For compensation, the content providers or content 
makers embed adverts from these actors in their content. The main 
difference between an advertiser and a sponsor is that the advertiser inserts 
adverts only at the stage of distribution while a sponsor includes their 
products or brand name already in the stage of content making. 
The search actors such as Google and Yahoo that match requests to content are not 
considered in this work for simplicity because they can exist in any of the distribution 
models and do not affect the traffic or monetary transfers between the discussed 
stakeholders. 
2.3 Content Delivery Models 
For a content provider trying to distribute content, several models exist. The most basic 
is the client-server that is employed in the basic Internet. Cloud and CDN offer a 
comprehensive package of services to the content providers in addition to the content 
delivery. In addition, the P2P model and different architectures of information 
networking are also means of Internet content delivery. 
Client-server 
Currently, the basic Internet is mainly based on one computing system model; the 
client-server model (Lewandowski, 1998). In the client-server model a server or a pool 
of servers stores information and services and waits passively for the clients to request 
them. The client can be any consumer that request services from the server. 
The client-server model requires network components to function properly. These 
network components are located between the client and the server for structured 
communication, i.e. the basic Internet interconnectivity structure. The servers and 
clients connect to the Internet access providers, who in turn connect to the Internet 
backbone provider for connection to the whole Internet. These together with the 
software used in the network form the basic Internet infrastructure, which can be used 
for content distribution. 
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Cloud 
Cloud computing (Vaquero, Rodero-Merino, Caceres and Lindner, 2009) is a service 
for better and easier hardware and software management. Clouds are pools of 
virtualised resources such as software, hardware and services that can be easily accessed. 
The idea of the cloud is to move the infrastructure to the network, which reduces the 
costs of resource managements and offers better scalability and flexibility. 
The cloud offers mainly three services; Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform 
as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS). In IaaS a hardware provider 
virtualises its resources so that they can be split and assigned dynamically to the 
customers. PaaS offers software platforms where systems can run on and the hardware 
resources required for this service are allocated in a transparent manner. SaaS offers 
software over the Internet as an on-demand service. All these cloud services are charged 
with a pay per use model and the service level agreements (SLAs) guarantee the quality 
of service. 
Content Delivery Network 
A content delivery network offers still more comprehensive services than cloud 
computing. The CDN was designed as an overlay on top of the basic Internet to provide 
better content distribution services. Internet overlays are virtual topologies that reside 
on top of the basic Internet and add value to the Internet by, for example, guaranteeing 
the data retrieval and offering load balancing (Doval and O’Mahony, 2003). The value 
added by a CDN are reliability of the network, reduced latencies for consumers, better 
throughput and origin server load balancing (Vakali and Pallis, 2003). 
The CDN structure does not differ much from the basic end-to-end connection; 
only an additional stakeholder and network element is added into the basic network; the 
CDN servers and network (Vakali and Pallis, 2003). This means that the connection is 
no longer end-to-end, rather it is divided into two separate end-to-end connections: 
between the client and the CDN and between the CDN and the content server. The 
services CDNs offer are comprehensive – ranging from storage and distribution to 
hardware and software management – making content delivery easier for the content 
provider. 
The CDNs’ business model is to build or rent networks and to sell capacity. 
Content providers pay the CDNs for the services they offer based on the amount of 
traffic transferred. For the larger content providers, a direct link is connected to the 
CDN for transfer of content. The smaller content providers transfer data to the CDN 
through an ISP. 
Peer-to-Peer 
Another overlay to the basic Internet is the peer-to-peer network (Schollmeier, 2002), 
which consists of distributed resources connected by the network. It has the same 
network components as the client-server model. The only difference is that the clients 
connected to the network can also act as servers whereas in the client-server model, the 
roles of client and server are distinct. 
Peer-to-peer networks have two architectures; the pure peer-to-peer and the hybrid 
peer-to-peer network. The pure peer-to-peer network does not have any central entity 
that controls the communication. In addition, the network service level does not suffer 
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from a removal of one peer. The hybrid peer-to-peer network, on the other hand, has a 
central entity that controls the communication and offers part of the services. 
Information Networking 
The current Internet was originally designed as an overlay to the telephone network and 
has not had major architectural changes since the beginning. It is an end-to-end network 
that connects two hosts wishing to communicate with each other. The routing of packets 
is based on the destination and source addresses. (Jacobsen et al., 2009) However, with 
the increase of content sharing in the Internet, the current architecture has become 
inefficient and new solutions are being developed. 
Routing in the information networking concept is based on what data is sought 
instead of where the data is (Jacobsen et al., 2009). This concept was first introduced by 
Van Jacobsen in a presentation in Google Tech Talks on August 30th 2006 (Jacobsen, 
2006), where he also identified the problems faced by the old telephone network and the 
current packet-switched Internet. 
The information networking concept aims at reaching a scalable and robust network, 
where security and trust are identified as the features that need to be implemented into 
the information networking design rather than as add-ons. The three reference 
architectures are the CCN, PSIRP and NetInf. CCN and NetInf can work as overlays on 
any kinds of network topology whereas PSIRP is a clean slate approach to replace the 
Internet Protocol (IP) network. 
The basic idea of information networking is that the network has cache servers that 
cache data. The data moves freely in the network. No clear standards on the existence of 
origin servers have been defined yet. If origin servers do exist, they would need less 
capacity as the data requests do not have to always go by the origin server due to the 
caches. This means cost savings for the content provider. 
CCN was proposed by Jacobsen et al (2009) and works with an Interest and Data 
packet pair. When Interest is expressed towards some data, the request is flooded out 
into the network and when it reaches someone who has the data, the Data packet is sent 
back. CCN can be thought of as the next step from the peer-to-peer topology. In CCN, 
the data is in the network and can be stored at any entity that it passes. Thus the 
equivalent of routers may cache the data that passes through it and next time the same 
Interest is received, it can reply with the data. 
NetInf (Ahlgren and Vercellone, 2010) has a similar idea to the CCN concept; a 
peer-to-peer network with caches within the network. In NetInf, the data is stored in 
Information Objects (IOs) that can be located anywhere in the network. Each IO has an 
identifier and with that identifier the data can be found and routed to the requestor. 
The PSIRP concept (Fotiou, Polyzos and Trossen, 2009) aims at building a clean-
slate Internet without taking anything as given. It adopts a publish/subscribe model, 
where the power is within the receiver rather than at the sender. The publishers are the 
content providers that publish data into the network. The subscribers express interest in 
certain data and the network delivers this data to them when it becomes available. The 
network has rendezvous points (RPs), where the matching of subscriptions and 
published data is done and forwarded. The publication may be cached by intermediate 
network components and when more than one subscribes to the data, the data is 
multicasted to the subscribers. 
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3. Two-sided Market Theory 
Two-sided market theory is a relatively new branch of economics theory compared to 
classical economics that has existed for centuries from the times of Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo (Glanville, 2003; p. 5, 386). The two-sided market or two-sided network 
effect is an economic theory that explains the behaviour of firms in markets that exhibit 
two-sidedness and is closely related to network externalities (Parker and Van Alstyne, 
2005). Most of the literature on two-sided markets and network externalities is written 
in the past two decades, the findings of which will be discussed in this section. 
3.1 Overview 
Many markets exhibit two-sidedness, such as any market with complementary products. 
For example, the razor and blades market is considered to be two-sided, since the sales 
of one product depend on the sales of the other. Another type of two-sided network is a 
two-sided platform, which brings two customer sections together. For example, the 
credit card industry is two-sided with credit card companies acting as platforms and 
offering services to merchants and card holders. However, even if a market exhibits 
two-sidedness, it might not be a two-sided market. Rochet and Tirole (2003) defined 
two-sided markets as: 
Markets with two distinct sides that are interlinked and where not only 
the overall price level matters but also the price structure between the 
two sides. 
Thus typically, the pricing in a two-sided platform is skewed with one side charged 
more than the other. According to Rochet and Tirole, the two-sided network effect is 
about getting both sides of the platform on board in the chicken-and-egg problem. Some 
examples of two-sided markets that comply with the above definition are listed in Table 
1, where the asterisk sign (*) shows the side being charged less or even subsidised. 
The basic literature on two-sided markets by, for example, Rochet and Tirole 
(2003), Armstrong (2006), Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) and Eisenmann et al. (2006) 
has been written from the platform’s perspective. Their papers concentrate on 
describing the behaviour of some typical two-sided platforms as well as developing a 
mathematical model for the pricing of a two-sided market. This section will describe the 
basic concepts related to two-sided markets. 
A platform, in computer science, refers to the basic hardware and software of a 
computer’s system and defines the principles on which a computer operates (Pearsall, 
1999; p. 1095). This definition is, however, only partly true in the two-sided market 
literature. A platform is more broadly understood as a market place for the two sides of 
the market to transact. For example, credit card companies provide a means of payment 
transactions for merchants and consumers. Evans and Schmalensee (2007) divided 
platforms into four types: Exchanges, Advertising-supported Media, Transaction 
Systems and Software Platforms. 
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Table 1. Examples of two-sided markets. (Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2006; Rochet and 
Tirole, 2003) 
Market Platform Side 1 Side 2 
PC Operating 
Systems Windows, Macintosh Consumers 
Application 
Developers* 
Online Recruitment Monster, CareerBuilder Job Seekers* Employers 
Yellow Pages Telephone Companies Consumers* Advertisers 
Web Search Google, Yahoo Searchers* Advertisers 
Video Games Nintendo, PlayStation Players* Games’ Developers 
Shopping Malls Shopping Malls Shoppers* Retailers 
Credit Cards Visa, MasterCard Card Holders* Merchants 
Real Estate Realtors Buyers* Sellers 
Media TV, Newspapers Consumers* Advertisers 
 
Rochet and Tirole (2003) divided the fees that platform charges from its two sides 
into usage fees and membership fees. Usage fees refer to the per transaction fees 
incurred by either side of the platform when a successful transaction occurs between the 
two sides. For example, in the credit card business, usage fees can be understood as the 
royalty the merchants have to pay the credit card company each time a consumer makes 
a purchase with a credit card. Membership fees, on the other hand, are fees charged for 
belonging to a platform. Using the credit card example again, the card holders, in other 
words the consumers, pay a monthly or yearly fee to the credit card company for being 
able to use their credit cards. 
The Rochet and Tirole (2003) paper mainly discusses usage fees thus it 
concentrates on prices charged by the platform on a per transaction basis. However, the 
mathematical model is extended to cover membership fees as well. Armstrong (2006), 
on the other hand, mainly assumes a pricing strategy of fixes prices rather than prices 
per transaction. Despite the differences in pricing strategies, both papers formed the 
same pricing structure for the two sides. Both papers conclude that the side, which is 
less price sensitive, should be charged more than the side with higher price sensitivity. 
Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) and Eisenmann et al. (2006) have reached a similar 
conclusion without extensive mathematical modelling. Rochet and Tirole also 
concluded that the skewed pricing should be practiced by two-sided markets regardless 
of the market structure, i.e. monopoly platform or competing platform. The next two 
sections explain the underlying reasoning why skewed pricing is profitable and in what 
kind of situations it can be used. 
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3.2 Externalities 
An externality in classical economics exists when an activity affects a third party that 
was not involved in the transaction (Glanville, 2003; p. 622). Externalities can be 
positive or negative: positive externalities are social benefits while negative 
externalities are social costs. For example, when planting a flower bush in the yard 
brings joy to all the households in the neighbourhood, it is a positive externality. On the 
other hand, if one of the neighbours is allergic to flowers, the planting of flowers will be 
a negative externality. Positive externalities in the field of communications are very 
common and it is the main reason why two-sided markets exist. Several types of 
consumption externalities are discussed below (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). 
A direct externality occurs when a consumer purchases a product based on the 
amount of other users using the same product. For example, consider a customer 
wanting to start using a peer-to-peer file sharing network. The amount of utility this 
consumer derives from the network depends on how many other users are on the 
network. The utility users derive from a network will be higher if the network is large 
compared to a network with less users. 
The size of the service network gives rise to indirect consumption externalities. For 
example, a consumer buying a 3G mobile handset will be interested in knowing how 
many other users have 3G mobile handsets because the network coverage, service 
provision as well as post-purchase services to the phone itself depend on the amount of 
existing users. 
Related to service provision is the software provision and complementary products 
provision. When deciding on hardware, the consumer is most likely going to choose the 
one with more existing software developed for it as the hardware would be useless 
without the software. 
All the above examples relate to the size of the existing customer base, which is 
defined as membership externality. To determine the relevant networks of consumers, it 
is important to know whether the different technologies are compatible with each other. 
For communications networks, if a subscriber of one network provider can 
communicate with a subscriber from another network provider, the two networks can be 
thought of as one network of consumers. This is the case at present in the telephone 
network – telephone users from any network, be it mobile or land line, can call another 
user in any other network. For hardware-software markets, the integration has not gone 
that far yet. Usually software developed by one company can only be used on that 
company’s hardware (Cusumano, 2008), although open source software is becoming 
more common, which may lead to better compatibility of technology. In addition, the 
size of service networks is usually restrained to one service provider only. For example, 
if you have a Sonera1 connection in Finland, your connection will only work where 
Sonera has coverage. 
In addition, usage externalities (Rochet and Tirole, 2006) determine how much a 
service is used. For example, if a credit card holder benefits from using the credit card 
rather than cash when making a purchase, the merchant is exerting a positive usage 
externality by accepting the card as a payment method. 
                                                 
1
 Sonera is a Finnish operator and is registered under TeliaSonera Finland Oyj in Finland. 
http://www.sonera.fi/. 
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The existence of externalities is the main reason why skewed pricing in two-sided 
markets exists. Usually to attract the users on one side, subsidies or discounts are 
offered to them. Because the platforms have this ability to attract large amounts of users 
on one side, they can charge the other side for the access to this side. 
3.3 Mathematical Model 
Both Armstrong, and Rochet and Tirole have developed independently a mathematical 
model for two-sided market behaviour and pricing. Because the models are very similar 
with minor differences in assumptions and notation, only one of them is discussed in 
this section: the Rochet and Tirole (2003) model. 
Rochet and Tirole have attempted to prove the skewed pricing in two-sided markets 
with different market structures and several market governance forms. Their paper 
started with monopoly platforms, which is further divided into privately owned 
monopoly and a monopoly practicing Ramsey optimal pricing. Monopoly is a market 
structure with only one major player offering a service aiming at maximising profit 
whereas a Ramsey optimal monopolist aims at maximising social welfare. A market 
structure where many platforms compete for customers is discussed then. The 
subcategories for competing platforms are proprietary platforms and associations. In 
addition, some modelling with symmetric and asymmetric prices has been made. Based 
on the monopoly and competing platforms modelling, a business model determinant 
was concluded as well as some generalisation of the model into membership fees and 
usage costs. 
Some assumptions and terminology of the paper is explained here. In the paper, 
interconnectivity of platform users are assumed to be the same regardless whether the 
market structure is monopoly or competitive. In addition, the demand for the platform 
of the two sides is assumed to be log concave. The two sides of the platform are called 
seller and buyer even if the platform’s business does not involve selling or buying. 
Prices mentioned below will always be the prices charged by the platform to the two 
sides based on a per usage basis unless otherwise stated. The below explanations will 
concentrate on the end results and the detailed mathematical calculations are provided 
in Appendix A. 
3.3.1 Monopoly Platforms 
Private Monopoly 
A monopoly platform is shown in Figure 3. Only one platform connects the buyers and 
sellers on the two sides. For example, the Apple application store is a monopoly 
platform for the Apple product users and the application developers for Apple products. 
 
A private monopoly platform aims at maximising its own profit. It will choose a 
price structure for buyers pB and sellers pS so as to maximise the profit function: 
Figure 3. Monopoly platform. 
Platform Buyers Sellers 
14 
 
 
 π = (pB + pS -c) DB(pB) DS(pS), (1) 
 
where DB and DS are the demand of buyers and sellers, respectively and c is the 
marginal cost the platform endures from each transaction. 
To maximise profit, the profit function has to be partially differentiated in respect to 
pB and pS separately and then the two differential equations are set to be equal. 
 
 η = − pD′D  (2) 
 η = − pDD  (3) 
 
Equations 2 and 3 show the price elasticities of demand of buyers and sellers, 
respectively, which measures the change in quantity demanded when the price is 
changed (Glanville, 2003, p. 627). By inserting the price elasticities of quasi-demand of 
buyer and seller into the differential equations and moving the terms around, Equation 4 
is reached. It shows that the price structure of a monopoly platform is given by the ratio 
of price elasticities of buyers’ and sellers’ demand. 
 
 
p
η = p

η →  p

p = η

η  (4) 
 
In addition, the total price level charged by the monopoly platform p = pB + pS can 
be given by the standard Lerner Index, Equation 5, if we let the total elasticity of the 
two sides to be the sum of the elasticity of the two sides, η = η + η. The Lerner index 
gives the degree of monopoly power a company has (Lerner, 1934). 
 
 
p − cp = 1η (5) 
Ramsey Pricing 
Under monopoly, a Ramsey monopolist also exists, who aims at maximising social 
welfare given the budget balance. Figure 3 also shows the market structure for Ramsey 
pricing. Equation 6 gives the social welfare, where V and V are the net surpluses of 
buyer and seller, respectively, for an average transaction. The budget balance is p + p = c because by definition economically efficient resource allocation is reached 
when the price equals marginal cost (Glanville, 2003; pp. 130-131). Thus when 
Equation 6 is partially differentiated under the budget balance constraint and in respect 
to p and p, social welfare is maximised. 
 
 W = VpDp + VpDp (6) 
 
Cost allocative efficiency, or Pareto efficiency, is reached when the social welfare 
changes the same amount regardless of whether the price of buyer or seller is changed; 
in other words when no one in the platform can be made better off without making 
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someone else worse off (Glanville, 2003; p. 158). Thus, the partial differentials of social 
welfare are set to be equal and after simplification, yield the Ramsey price structure for 
cost allocative efficiency: 
 
VD η

p = V

D η

p (7) 
 
Ramsey pricing by definition means charging more from the side with relatively 
inelastic demand when a price is to be raised (Ramsey, 1927). From Equation 7 it can 
be seen, that the price structure for Ramsey pricing is also dependent on the ratio of the 
price elasticities of demand. Thus the mathematical modelling proves the Ramsey 
pricing definition and that the Ramsey prices take into consideration the average 
surpluses created on the other side of the platform. 
3.3.2 Competing Platforms 
Realistically no monopolies exist, thus Figure 4 shows a market structure where more 
than one platform competes for the consumers. The credit card industry is a good 
example as consumers have credits cards from more than one company and a merchant 
usually accepts more than one credit card company’s cards. 
 
In competing platforms, a transaction occurs only if both the buyer and seller 
choose the same platform. The prices charged by the competing platforms can be 
symmetric or asymmetric. When prices are symmetric, the platforms charge the same 
prices and it can be paralleled to a monopoly platform by assuming joint ownership of 
the competing platforms. When prices are asymmetric, the seller has three possibilities 
regarding where to trade depending on its benefit, b, from the transacting with a certain 
platform. 
The seller will not affiliate with any platform if its benefit is smaller than the lowest 
price charged by the cheapest platform. By assuming that platform 1 has a lower price 
than platform 2, it can be said that when b ≤  p , the seller will not trade on any 
platform. 
Sellers trade on both platforms, i.e. multihome, if their benefit is bigger than the 
average price of additional demand when multihoming given by Equation 8, i.e. if b ≥ b . Equation 8 is given assuming still that platform 1 has lower prices than 
platform 2 and where d  and d   are the demand for buyers for platform 1 and 2, 
respectively, when the seller multihomes. 
 
 b = p d  − pD − dd  − D − d  (8) 
Figure 4. Competing platforms. 
Platform 
Buyers Sellers 
Platform 
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When a seller’s benefit is larger than the lowest price but lower than the average 
price of additional demand when multihoming, the seller will only trade on the less 
expensive platform. Using the above assumption on platform prices, the seller with type p < b < b  will only trade on platform 1. 
It is further assumed that when sellers affiliate with multiple platforms, it is the 
buyer that decides where the transaction takes place. The dependence of a buyer on a 
certain seller is denoted by the buyer’s singlehoming index of platform i, Equation 9. 
The singlehoming index measures a buyer’s loyalty for platform i, meaning the 
proportion of buyers that will stop trading when platform i ceases to exist. At the same 
time, the singlehoming index measures the proportion of buyers who will switch to a 
new platform when the seller switches to another platform. 
 
 σ" = d + d  − D#d" ;  i, j = 1,2; i ≠ j; σ" ∈ [0, 1] (9) 
Proprietary Platform 
Under competing platforms, two governance forms exist: proprietary and associations. 
Proprietary platforms are owned by companies that aim at the highest profit and the 
structure is shown in Figure 4. This means that proprietary platforms may have 
exclusive ownership over some assets (Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 2000), from which 
they gain competitive advantage and thus profit. For example, the video game console 
makers have exclusive rights to promote and sell their own consoles. 
As with the monopoly case, to maximise profit, the profit function, Equation 10, 
has to be differentiated partially first with respect to p" and then to p". 
 
 π" = +p" + p" − c,Q" (10) 
 
By setting the two differentials to be equal, the following equation is obtained: 
 
 
∂Qp =
∂Qp = −
Qp + p − c , (11) 
 
where Q is the transaction volume for platform 1: 
 
 Q = dpD+b , + D.p/D+p, − D+b ,0 when p < p  (12) 
 Q = ddpD+b , when p  < p (13) 
 
To find the differentials for Q, both Equation 12 and 13 should be differentiated 
with respect to p and p and set to equal. By inserting the result into Equation 11 and 
solving for the prices, the price structure for a proprietary platform is found: 
 
 p + p − c = p
η1
= p
η/σ →  p

p =
η1
η σ (14) 
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The result is otherwise the same as in the monopoly case, however, the buyer’s 
price elasticity of demand, η, is replaced by the own-brand elasticity of demand η1. In 
addition, the seller’s demand elasticity, η, is replaced by an elasticity equivalent to the 
own-brand elasticity, η/σ, which is dependent on the singlehoming index. 
Associations 
Association platforms, on the other hand, are owned by members of the platform and 
run by the not-for-profit organisations shown in Figure 5. Prices charged to the 
consumers of an association are set by the members while the access charges are set by 
the platform. For example, the credit card company, Visa, is an association which is 
owned by the issuing banks and the banks decide on the usage fees (Visa, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
Because the members compete with each other within each platform and the 
platform is not aiming at maximising profit, the price level is set to equal the platform’s 
total marginal cost: p" + p" = c + m, where m is the total margin on the downstream 
markets. This price setting will maximise the volume thus the transaction volume 
functions can be differentiated to gain the price structure as in the case of proprietary 
platforms. The resulting price structure is also the same, Equation 14. 
From the above modelling, it can be seen that the private monopoly’s and 
competing platform’s pricing are not efficient. This is because, the only efficient pricing 
model is Ramsey pricing, which was determined through economic efficiency 
conditions and all the other pricing models differ in their forms from the Ramsey model. 
3.3.3 Generalisations 
This section explains the business model generalisation based on the above 
mathematical models. In addition, the membership fees are taken into consideration in 
this section and a generalised model for determining the price structure of a two-sided 
market is formulated. 
Business model 
A business model was concluded from the mathematical models. The prices for buyers 
and sellers always move in opposite directions, i.e. when buyers’ prices go up, sellers’ 
prices drop, and the amount depends on their respective demand elasticities. When a 
marquee buyer, i.e. a large and influential buyer, is present, the seller prices rise as the 
Figure 5. Competition between associations. 
Platform 
Buyers Sellers 
Members 
Platform 
Members 
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marquee buyer increases the seller’s surplus from transacting on the platform. On the 
other hand, when captive buyers are present, the seller’s price will fall because the 
platform can charge more from the captive buyers without losing them. Similarly, when 
the buyer’s singlehoming index rises, the platform can charge more from the buyers. 
Membership fees 
So far, the discussion has assumed membership fees and fixed usage costs to be non-
existent. However, the model can be extended to cover these as well. A new transaction 
volume function has been defined to take into consideration the fixed usage costs γ" and 
γ# for platforms i and j, respectively: 
 
N" = Pr+U" > max+0,  U#,, = d"+p, N, p , N ,= Pr +b" − p",N" − c − γ"≥ max 80, +b# − p#,N# − c − γ#9 → N" = N, N  = n"+p, p, p , p , 
(15) 
 U"  and  U#  in Equation 15 give the net utility for buyers in platforms i and j, 
respectively. By using the new transaction volume function, a new profit function can 
be formulated: 
 
 π" = p" + p" − cN"N" (16) 
 
By differentiating the new profit function just like in the previous governance forms, 
the price structure that takes into consideration fixed costs is obtained and shown in 
Equation 17. 
 
 
p + p − c = p
η11 + η;  =
p
η + η+1 + η; ,  →  
pp =
η1
η + η (17) 
 
Equation 17 shows that the price structure is dependent on the ratios of elasticities. 
On the buyer’s side, the own-brand elasticity is used. The difference from previous 
results is on the seller’s side, where instead of demand elasticity or own-brand elasticity, 
a combination of own-brand elasticity and cross elasticity of buyer demand is used. 
3.4 Conclusion 
It can be concluded from the above discussions that skewed pricing is profitable for 
two-sided markets. Here it will be illustrated with two figures, Figure 6 and Figure 7. 
Figure 6 shows the normal pricing policies, where both sides of the market are charged 
a price so that the quantity demanded on one side matches the quantity demanded on the 
other side. The revenue in this case is maximised separately by both sides and is shown 
by the blue areas. 
As a result of lowering side 1’s price from p1 to p1’, the quantity demand for side 
1’s services has grown. This has lead to side 2’s demand growing, which is shown in 
Figure 7 as a shift of the demand curve to the right. Figure 7 also shows the new 
revenues of both sides. On side 1, the red area represents the new revenue and the 
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chequered blue area is the revenue lost due to the lowered price. On side 2, the 
chequered blue area is the same as in Figure 6 and the red area represents the additional 
revenue gained from the rising demand and the potentially rising price. 
Whether revenue is gained or lost due to skewed pricing depends on the elasticities 
of the two sides; in other words, the slope of the demand curves in Figure 6 and Figure 
7. In addition, the decision to raise the side 2 price also depends on the elasticity of the 
side 2 demand curve, so that the maximum combined revenue from both sides is 
obtained. Given that the revenue is higher and assuming that the marginal cost of the 
services stays the same, the profit will be maximised. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Skewed pricing. 
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Figure 6. Normal pricing. 
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The theory did not only change the pricing structure of two-sided markets but it has 
also affected the policy makers. Wright (2004) recognised eight fallacies about two-
sided markets that come from one-sided regulations and policies. These fallacies deal 
with efficiency questions and anti-trust considerations as well as fairness of pricing. The 
most important findings that two-sided market theory offers policy makers are that 
charging one side of the market below marginal cost does not necessarily compromise 
market efficiency and that an increase in competition may not necessarily lead to a more 
efficient price structure.  
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4. Interviews 
In this work, expert interviews are conducted to deepen the knowledge of the content 
delivery market. This section explains the interview procedure including the schedule 
and the number of interviewees. In addition, this section also presents the results of the 
interviews. 
4.1 Procedure 
When doing an interview, mainly three formats can be chosen: fully-structured, semi-
structured and unstructured interviews (Robson, 2002). Fully-structured interviews 
follow a predetermined list of questions in the predetermined order. Usually the 
questions use specific wording that is not changed during interviews. The 
predetermined list of questions in semi-structured interviews acts as a guideline only, 
the order and the wording of the questions may be altered depending on the situation. In 
addition, questions may be omitted or added to better suit each interviewee. An 
unstructured interview can be quite informal and the conversation can develop freely 
within the interest area. 
This work employs semi-structured interviews and a list of the interview questions 
is shown in Appendix B. The interview questions are divided according to three fields 
of expertise; the content providers, the Internet service providers and the data centre 
providers. From each field two interviewees are selected. In addition, two more 
interviewees from the education sector are interviewed for general information on the 
current Internet structure and the information networking functionalities. Thus 
altogether 8 interviewees are interviewed and they are listed in Table 2 with their 
current job title. Table 2 also presents the names given to each interviewee for 
referencing purposed in the text below. 
 
Table 2. Table of interviewees. 
Field of expertise Position in company Referencing 
Content provider CEO CP1 
Content provider Head of Technology CP2 
Internet Service Provider Technology Director ISP1 
Internet Service Provider Ex-Vice President of Strategy 
and Business Development ISP2 
Data Centre Provider CEO DCP1 
Data Centre Provider Head of Services DCP2 
General Information on 
Internet Senior Research Scientist EDU1 
Information Networking Professor EDU2 
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The chosen content providers both offer video streaming as their main content 
service, though CP2 also offers other Internet content on a smaller scale. CP2 is a large 
provider, which provides the mainstream videos while CP1 is a start-up and aims at 
catching niche markets. The smaller company does not only offer streaming of old 
videos but also live streaming of sports games. 
Both Internet service providers are Internet backbone providers internationally. 
Nationally, they also offer Internet access services. ISP1 mainly offers services to 
corporations such as content providers. In addition, both ISPs offer either web hosting 
services or CDN services. 
CDP2 in the data centre category was an actual data centre provider while DCP1 
offers networking services and Internet data security solutions. However, DCP1 owns a 
web hosting company. 
The interviews were conducted over a four-week period in the spring of 2010 with 
most of the interviews during one week and a few scattered interviews during other 
weeks. Each of the interviews was estimated to last for approximately an hour. At the 
beginning of each interview, a short presentation of the aims of this work was presented 
to the interviewees for their better understanding of the work and to obtain more 
relevant answers. 
4.2 Results 
Because a semi-structured interview was chosen, the order of the questions was changed 
quite freely in the interview situations to better suit the conversation flow. The 
estimated time for each interview was an hour. In reality, the interviews took from 45 
minutes to 1.5 hours. This section presents a summary of the interview results, which 
are divided according to the topics discussed in the interviews: content distribution 
models, stakeholder cost types, future of content distribution and information 
networking. 
4.2.1 Features of Content Distribution Models 
In the interviews, the different content distribution models used and considered are 
discussed. In addition, the features of each model appreciated or disliked by each 
stakeholder are explained. 
The content providers have considered CDN, the client-server model and cloud as 
the alternatives for content distribution. In the end, both companies have chosen to use a 
combination of CDNs and client-server with their own or leased servers. The CDNs 
play a small part and is only used for live streaming or where large traffic amounts are 
expected. The CDN companies that are in use or have been used are Level 3, 
TeliaSonera and Akamai. Leased and private servers are the main method for content 
storage and local ISPs are used for content distribution.  
The most important feature of any content provider’s current distribution setup is 
cost efficiency. The next most important features are scalability and reliability. 
Flexibility and fast distribution of content are at the bottom of the list. In addition, a 
very important feature for the smaller provider [CP1] with regard to CDNs or leasing 
servers is the lack of investment upfront. 
As the content provider’s decision of distribution model was based on the costs of 
each model and the client-server model with either the content provider’s own, rented or 
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leased servers is the first choice of content providers, it can be concluded that the client-
server model is the most cost efficient choice from the considered models. From 
Norton’s (2008) calculations, it can also be seen that excluding peer-to-peer, the hybrid 
transit/peering, i.e. client-server, model is the most cost effective for mid to large scale 
content providers. In addition, reliability and geographical coverage are considered as 
criteria for choosing the content distribution model. The client-server model is quite 
reliable as the content provider has total control over one’s own servers and 
maintenance, which guarantees the service availability. Because in the client-server 
model the content distribution can be handled by local Internet service providers, the 
delay and inefficiency due to geographical distances may not a problem as ISPs are 
everywhere. 
When the content provider gains more users, scalability becomes a problem for the 
client-server model. This is why the content providers when they grow bigger also buy 
services from the CDN for the most popular content. Scalability thus is the main selling 
point for CDNs. 
A drawback for the CDN service is its high price. However, the prices of CDNs are 
falling and the content providers seem to be happy with the current price vs. quality 
ratio of CDNs. Another disadvantage of CDNs is geographical coverage as CDNs do 
not have service offerings everywhere in the world. For example, in Asia, CDNs do not 
have proper coverage [CP1]. 
Some other features that are missing from the CDNs’ service include mobile device 
enabled protocols, storage of different mobile device file extensions and user 
identification, which directly relate to copyright protection [CP1]. For example, now 
copyright is protected by geographical regions; some content can only be accessed 
within Finland. If every user can be identified, copyright can be better protected. The 
copyright protection is now left to the responsibility of content makers and if the 
content makers do not obey copyright laws, their IPs can be banned from using the 
content providers’ service. 
From an ISP’s perspective, it does matter which content distribution model is used. 
The client-server traffic does not strain the backbone network as much as the access 
network because according to ISP1, the growth of off-net traffic has slowed to 10% in 
2009 due to the increase of video traffic while on-net traffic has grown by 300%. On the 
other hand, CDNs and large server hotels cause a lot of traffic load around them, which 
means they should be placed close to consumers. ISPs receive cloud traffic as transit 
traffic, or over peering networks, and pass this traffic along so it is just like any other 
type of traffic. 
4.2.2 Stakeholder Costs 
An important topic of the interviews is the cost types the different groups of 
interviewees face regarding content distribution. This section summarises these costs for 
each group. 
The main costs the content providers face arise from the traffic amount, i.e. Internet 
connectivity costs and streaming. In addition, CDN fees and server rents also comprise 
a large part of the costs. Encoding and other software costs, human expertise and 
infrastructure are also a significant part of the cost structure. 
An ISP incurs most of its costs by offering network capacity. The costs of building 
the physical backbone network are quite significant for an ISP. In addition, ISPs bare 
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costs from transit and peering agreements. Power consumption is also a large expense 
for ISPs, especially those that offer CDN or web hosting services. Some minor costs 
arise from customer billing and marketing, etc. 
The data centres incur the largest costs from infrastructure building and 
maintenance. These include office and server hall space, air conditioning for servers and 
Internet connectivity. Some other costs include information and communication 
technologies (ICT) such as firewalls and operating systems as well as human capital. In 
addition, 18% of ICT sector’s power consumption in the world is caused by data centres 
(European Commission, 2010) thus energy is a major source of costs. Hardware costs 
are no longer a major cost source because the storage capacity costs are falling. 
4.2.3 Content Distribution Market Prospects 
The interviewees also talked about the current content distribution market situation and 
based on it discussed the future of the market. These findings are presented in this 
section. 
ISP1 offers web hosting services, which solely concentrate on renting servers and 
server maintenance. The web hosting sector of the company grows twice as fast as the 
rest of the company thus they have also considered becoming a CDN. At the moment, 
they also rent servers and sell Internet capacity to CDNs. CDNs mainly pay ISP1 a 
fixed monthly rate but they can also be charged for the traffic amount transferred. 
The current network keeps growing as the amount of information grows and the 
capacity needs are also growing [EDU1], requiring faster Internet connections and 
cables. From the current cables only a small percentage can be used to transport traffic 
at the speed of 100 gigabytes/s. Thus when the physical bottleneck is reached, the old 
cables have to be replaced with new ones that can accommodate the higher speed traffic. 
Due to this reason, the network capacity cannot keep growing endlessly, and other 
solutions have to be implemented. 
According to the ISPs, the Internet is developing into a video or media network. 
CDN is now a major player in the content distribution business and the interviewees 
believe that without CDN the current Internet would have died already due to lack of 
capacity. However, the current CDN is not enough to satisfy the needs with the current 
development trend. The current capacity is not enough to watch unicast Internet TV and 
because multicast is not available to all the consumers, the current CDN model has to 
change to accommodate the demand growth. Alternatively a proper P2P system with 
supernodes could be developed or common anycast standards could be agreed on [ISP1]. 
In addition, ISP1 believes that Google Net will break away from the current 
Internet within this decade because the Internet limits it and filters its services. It 
already has the infrastructure available for being a separate network; i.e. mail servers, 
domain name servers, etc. 
4.2.4 Information Networking 
Following the future of the market discussion are the questions relating to caching and 
information networking. The following findings are made. 
ISPs do not do caching; however, the option of caching is under consideration. In 
addition, ISPs are interested in investing in network supernodes for caching data 
because it would reduce capacity requirements on the backbone. Caching used to be 
more popular with ISPs before but because the content is dynamic and becomes stale 
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quickly, caching soon became less popular. In addition, advertising now tends to be 
personalised, thus ads cached with the traffic for one user is not valid for another user. 
Dynamic content is also a challenge for information networking. 
It will take time before the majority of routers have caching capabilities. However, 
the development is going in the direction of a complete semantic network. Take, for 
example, the Cisco UCS (Cisco, 2010b) that installs blade servers into its routers. The 
blade servers cache content closer to the consumers; it is more efficient and feasible and 
is a step in the right direction. 
On an abstract level, information networking is basically a network with CDN 
servers everywhere. This gives rise to the question whether it is enough for Akamai or 
another large CDN to locate its servers within each IAP or is having caching capability 
on every router really needed [EDU2]. Information networking can also be compared to 
a data cloud network, which covers the whole Internet. 
The content providers think that information networking is a good idea if it leads to 
cost savings. In addition, they think that the capacity requirements at the origin server of 
the content can be lowered if information networking is really in use. However, they 
raised a few challenges that have to be addressed before the network is viable. Live 
video streaming with P2P is challenging because the source may stop seeding at any 
time. Because information networking is similar to P2P, the same problems can arise. In 
addition, because the content is cached within the network, anyone who has access to 
the network can view the content. This may cause control issues to arise, such as 
copyright infringements. 
On the other hand, the information networking system would be more self-
controlling thus requiring less network management. The concept sounds like a smart 
idea and it has already been used by AppleTalk where each network component is 
accessed by its name and not address (Kosiur, 2003). 
Despite all the talk about the Internet growing and the need for new solutions, 
DCP1 has not received any signs from the market on the need for a system like 
information networking even though they are in the networking business. Thus it may 
take ten years for the concept to be widely deployed. It would seem that the network is 
going in the general direction of information networking but it will be slow. Some 
issues have been raised: how will the routers communicate with each other? In addition, 
the possibility that no common standard is provided and manufacturers have their own 
standards exists, which leads to routers not being able to communicate with each other. 
This was a problem when the current Internet was implemented. 
DCP2 believes that information networking can be both a threat and an opportunity 
depending on how the company reacts to the change. Technology itself is neither bad 
nor good; it is only a tool for making business. Companies also follow the Darwinian 
law of evolution. If a company can adapt to the environmental and technical changes 
and make use of the new ideas, it will prosper, otherwise it will die away. 
  
26 
 
5. Value Networks of Content Delivery Models 
A major part of the Internet is content sharing and many architectural solutions for 
content delivery exist. From the five content distribution models discussed in Section 
2.3, the client-server model, Content Delivery Networks and information networking 
are examined in this section by analysing their costs and modelling their value networks. 
Peer-to-peer and cloud are also alternatives for content distribution but they are not 
widely used by content providers based on the interview, therefore they are not 
discussed in this section. The information on value networks and costs are based on 
public information as well as interviews. The next sections will follow the general 
structure of first explaining the value network’s traffic, monetary and intangible flows 
and then explain the weighted arrows separately. Lastly, the cost a content provider 
faces in each content distribution model is discussed. 
5.1 Value Network Notation 
The value network notation used in this work is derived from Allee’s (2000a) Three 
Currencies of Value. Allee’s value network configuration defines three key value 
exchanges or currencies: 
1. Goods, Services and Revenue (Actual goods or services and the monetary 
payments). 
2. Knowledge (Strategic information, planning and process knowledge, 
technical know-how, etc). 
3. Intangible Benefits (Customer loyalty, sense of community, image 
enhancement, co-branding opportunity). 
In addition, Zhao (2008) has adopted a modified categorisation of value exchanges 
to better fit the networking context in his work on mobile Internet: 
1. Services and Goods 
2. Monetary Benefit 
3. Intangible Benefits (Attention, loyalty, information) 
This work adopts the basic idea of Allee’s configuration but with a few 
modifications based on Zhao’s configuration to better suit the context of this study. The 
currency names used in this work are listed and explained below. 
1. Traffic Transfer 
2. Monetary Transfer 
3. Intangible Benefits 
i. I1: Brand recognition 
ii. I2: Loyalty 
iii. I3: Information 
The biggest difference from the previous configurations is the first value exchange. 
The goods and services offered in Internet content distribution is Internet content, which 
is transferred as Internet traffic. Consumers, on the other hand, produce Internet traffic 
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when requesting Internet content. Thus the first value exchange is named traffic transfer 
and each traffic transfer shows the physical link between two stakeholders. 
Because the value network in this work shows the technical connectivity between 
stakeholders, process knowledge transfers do not exist. In addition, the revenue received 
by each stakeholder does not fit into traffic transfer, thus the second currency is called 
monetary transfer similarly to Zhao’s monetary benefit. 
The last currency in this work is also called intangible benefits. Allee (2000b) 
divides intangible benefits into six subcategories: business relationships, human 
competence, internal structures, social citizenship, environmental health and corporate 
identity. Trust between stakeholders is part of business relationships and thus one of the 
intangibles in this work is loyalty. Zhao includes brand recognition within loyalty while 
attention is used to describe the benefit received from advertising. However, in this 
work brand recognition replaces attention because brand recognition is the consequence 
of increased attention. According to Allee’s (2008) definition of intangibles, an 
intangible benefit can arise from converting a tangible value input into non-financial 
assets. Thus gathered information is the third intangible benefit because usage 
information may, for example, increase the level of marketing competence of a 
company. 
5.2 Client-Server Model 
To use the client-server model for content distribution, content providers rent or 
purchase servers for storing the content and consumers access the contents by 
requesting them from the servers. The complete value network with weighted traffic and 
monetary transfer arrows for the client-server model is shown in Figure 8. The possible 
peering agreements between IAPs are not shown in the value network because they are 
not considered in this work. 
Content provider resides on the server side. The content provider’s internal value 
network is shown within the dotted box in Figure 8. It shows that the content makers 
may not be the content providers. When content maker do not distribute content 
themselves, a one-way traffic flow from the content maker to the content provider is 
shown. A two-way monetary transfer between the CP and the content maker exists 
because the content maker may pay the content provider for the distribution service 
while the content provider forwards the consumers’ content fees to the content makers. 
For data storage, the content provider can either purchase own servers or rent server 
capacity from the data centre provider, thus a monetary transfer from the content 
provider to the data centre provider is drawn. If data centres are used, a traffic transfer is 
drawn from the content provider to the server. In addition, the data centre provider can 
also provide some usage information and other services to the content provider, which 
is shown as a transfer of I2 in Figure 8. Other intangible benefits between the content 
provider and the data centre provider are trust and reliability related benefits in the 
relationship or partnership, i.e. loyalty shown as I3. 
For distribution when using own server, the CP’s own servers are connected to the 
Internet through the Internet access provider and the Internet backbone provider, thus a 
monetary transfer from the content provider box to the IAP is shown. The IAP then 
pays the IBP for the backbone connectivity, which is shown as a monetary transfer from 
the IAP to IBP in Figure 8. The data centres have backbone access in their premises and 
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part of this capacity is allocated to the servers rented to a CP. The data centres pay the 
Internet backbone provider for the backbone access as shown in Figure 8 by the 
monetary and traffic transfers directly from the CP box to the IBP. 
On the client side, the consumer connects to the Internet through an IAP, which is 
connected to the IBP. Thus the consumer pays the IAP, which in turn pays the IBP for 
the Internet access. In the own server’s case, when the consumer requests content from 
the content provider, it first sends the request to its own IAP. If the consumer’s IAP is 
the same as the content provider’s IAP, the request can be directly forwarded to the 
content servers. If the consumer’s IAP does not have direct connection to the servers, 
the request is forwarded through the IBP to the content provider’s IAP. In the case of 
rented servers, the request traffic from consumer group 2 goes through the backbone 
directly to the data centre provider. After the servers receive the content request, a reply 
with the content is sent back to the consumer. This is shown as the traffic transfers 
between the consumer and IAP, the IAP and IBP, the IAP and the server, and the IBP 
and the server in Figure 8. In addition, a possible money transfer from the consumer to 
the content provider for the content exists. 
In addition, the content provider may have other revenue sources than content fees 
such as the advertising revenue model and sponsorships. In the advertising case, the 
advertisers pay the CP for putting adverts on the content, which is shown as a monetary 
transfer from the advertiser to the CP. The transfer of the adverts to the CP is shown as 
the traffic transfer. In addition, advertisers receive an intangible benefit I1, which stems 
from the increased publicity when consumers see the adverts. The sponsors usually deal 
with the content makers instead of directly with the content providers. The content 
makers get sponsorships from companies and the content provider may either get its 
revenue from sharing the sponsorship or through content distribution fees. The benefit 
for the sponsors is the same as for the advertisers; the publicity and brand recognition. 
Though publicity arises from consumers, for simplicity of the value networks, this 
intangible benefit originates from the content provider and content makers. 
Weighted Value Network 
In Figure 8, the thickness of the transfer lines represents the amount of traffic or money 
transfers thus lines with the same thickness represent the same amount of traffic. The 
money transferred for the service always has the same thickness as the corresponding 
traffic transfer’s arrow. The monetary transfer between the content provider and the 
content maker is not weighted because the amount depends on the charging principles 
used between the two and not on network architectures. In addition, the traffic amount 
from the advertiser to the content provider is not weighted because the adverts are 
transferred to the content provider and stored in their servers thus the traffic amount 
from the advertiser does not depend on the amount of content users. 
When using the data centre service, the traffic between the content maker and 
content provider and between the content provider and the data centre has the same 
thickness, which means that all the content the content maker sends to the content 
provider is forwarded to the rented servers in the data centre’s premises. In addition, the 
traffic between the CP box and the Internet backbone provider, the IBP and the Internet 
access provider 2 and between the IAP2 and the Consumers group 2 are equally large. 
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Figure 8. Value network of the client-server model. 
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This means that when the consumers in group 2 requests data, it is all forwarded 
through the Internet access provider 2 to the Internet backbone provider, who then 
requests the data from the data centre. The requested data is returned through the same 
path. It is not important and cannot be known whether the traffic from the content 
provider to the data centre or the traffic between the CP box and the Internet backbone 
provider are the same, thus the traffic between the CP box and the IBP is assumed to be 
thicker in Figure 8 for easier comparison between content distribution models. 
In the value network, the consumer group 1 represent the consumers who are on the 
same access network as the content provider while the consumer group 2 consists of all 
the consumers on a different access network than the content provider and thus needs 
backbone connections to reach the content. Due to this reason, the consumer group 2 is 
assumed to be larger than consumer group 1. Because of the size difference in the 
consumer groups, the traffic amount also is different. From the weighted value network, 
it can be seen that the consumer group 1 has less traffic than the consumer group 2. This 
also means that the consumers in group 1 as a group pay less than the consumer group 2. 
However, it is presumed that individually each consumer pays approximately the same 
amount.  
When the content provider uses its own server, all the content is delivered through 
the content provider’s own Internet access provider. As can be seen from Figure 8, most 
traffic traverses between the content provider box and its Internet access provider. This 
is because both the consumers 1’s and 2’s requests and content transfers go through the 
Internet access provider 1. 
Because the monetary transfer between the actors depends on the corresponding 
traffic amount between each actor, the greatest monetary transfer is from the content 
provider to its own Internet access provider (IAP1). The smallest monetary transfers are 
the fees consumers 1 pay IAP1 and the content provider due to its small size of 
population. Consumers 2’s payment transfer to the IAP2 and the content provider are 
the same thickness as the amount of traffic it generates and content it uses. Because the 
IAP2 forwards all the traffic consumers 2 generate, the monetary transfer between the 
IAP2 and the Internet backbone provider is the same size as the consumers 2’s fee to 
IAP2. Depending on whether rented or the CP’s own servers are use, the monetary 
transfer from the data centre and the IAP1 to the Internet backbone provider has the 
same volume compared with each other and with the consumers 2’s fee to IAP2. The 
monetary transfer from the content provider to the data centre for the rented server 
capacity and Internet backbone access corresponds to the content amount stored and 
transferred and thus is thicker than the traffic transfer from the content provider to the 
data centre. 
The size of the intangible benefits I1 and I2 depends on the consumer’s population 
size. I2 is only affected by the size of consumers group 2 whereas I1 is affected by both 
the consumers 1 and the consumers 2. Therefore, I1’s thickness is the same as the traffic 
between the content provider and the Internet access provider 1. I2’s thickness is then 
equal to the traffic amount going through the Internet backbone provider from the 
consumers 2 to the data centre. The monetary transfers from the sponsors and 
advertisers correspond to the size of their intangible benefits and hence the arrows have 
equal thickness. I3’s size, however, cannot be determined because the reliability, quality 
and other guarantees depends on the two companies and their mutual relations. 
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Costs 
The types of costs a content provider faces when using the client-server model are 
discussed in this section. The list is comprised based on the interviews, the summary of 
which is shown in the previous section. The cost types vary depending on whether the 
content provider’s operation is large scale or a smaller business. 
For large content providers, the main costs arise from the large amount of traffic. 
The amount of traffic requires fast Internet connections and large capacity, which is 
costly. Besides a large amount of traffic, the content data amount stored is also great. 
This requires vast server capacity and because a large content provider may have the 
benefit of economies of scale, they tend to build their own server systems. In addition, 
the larger the content amount, the more encoding of the contents into a compatible 
format is required. For reliability and better after sales service, larger content providers 
tend to use proprietary software or program their own software rather than use open 
source firmware. The server maintenance, license fees and programming costs 
contribute to the overall expenses. 
A smaller content provider often leases servers and thus the renting cost forms a big 
part of their cost structure. In addition, the Internet connection and other infrastructure 
investments may become a major expense. However, the server leasers also tend to 
offer network connectivity, which lessens the CP’s need for a high speed Internet 
connection. In addition, smaller content providers may not have much capital and they 
tend to use open source software, which cuts costs. Encoding costs are also faced by the 
smaller content provider; however, because the amount of data and traffic is smaller, the 
proportion of encoding costs with respect to the total costs is smaller. 
When the content provider is also the content maker, some costs arise from 
producing the content. On the other hand, if the content provider does not make its own 
content and distributes content with copyright protection, the right for distribution has to 
be bought from the owner. Marketing costs may rise if content providers advertise their 
services. In addition, all content providers have employees, to whom a salary has to be 
paid, which incurs human capital expenses. 
5.3 Content Delivery Networks 
The CDN market currently has over twenty pure-play CDN providers in addition to the 
telecommunications operators and carriers that operate their own CDNs (Rayburn, 
2010). The value network for a content provider using the CDN service is shown in 
Figure 9. Similarly to the client-server model, the content makers may not be the same 
as the content providers. The revenue models for CPs are also the same as in the client-
server model with advertising, sponsorships and from the content and its distribution. 
When the content provider uses a CDN, the same two possible ways to store data 
exist as in the client-server model, i.e. using servers the CP owns or rented servers from 
the data centre provider. A CP may choose to use both CDN and the basic Internet for 
content distribution, where the less delay sensitive content is distributed through the IBP. 
This is also shown in Figure 9. However, here only the traffic caused by the CDN is 
discussed as the rest of the value network is the same as in the client-server model. 
To connect to the CDN, the CP can connect via an IAP or have a direct link to the 
CDN’s servers. The content provider pays the CDN for content caching and distribution 
thus a monetary transfer is drawn from the content provider box to the CDN in either 
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case. If an IAP is used, the content provider pays the IAP for the Internet access, thus 
both a monetary and data transfer are drawn from the content provider to the IAP. The 
IAP then forwards the content to the CDN. If the CDN has a direct link to the content 
provider, an actual data transfer directly from the content provider to the CDN exists. 
Only one traffic line is drawn from the CP box to the CDN because it is insignificant to 
know whether the content is stored within the data centre or the CP’s own servers. 
For consumers, the CDN does not change the flow of traffic and payments. The 
consumer still sends content requests to its own IAP and pays both the IAP for Internet 
access and the content provider for the content. The difference is with the consumer’s 
IAP, which forwards the request directly to the CDN instead of the IBP. The CDN 
replies to the IAP without asking the content provider for the content if the requested 
content is cached at the CDN. If no cache for the content is found, the CDN will request 
it from the CP as in the client-server model. If the consumer uses the same IAP as the 
content provider, the IAP can directly request the data from the content provider 
without going through the CDN. 
For the whole Internet interconnectivity, a monetary transfer from the IAP’s is 
received by the IBP. Lastly, intangible benefits may be flowing between the content 
provider and the CDN, for example, in the form of usage information. 
Weighted Value Network 
Similarly to the client-server model, the thickness of the arrows represents the volume 
of each transfer. The volumes of the monetary transfers are also equal to the 
corresponding traffic transfer’s volume. The monetary transfer between the content 
maker and the content provider, the traffic from the advertiser to the content provider 
and the intangible benefit I3 are not considered in this analysis for the same reasons as 
in the client-server model. 
Because all of the content that the content provider is sharing is sent to the CDN for 
distribution, the arrows from the content maker to the content provider, from the content 
provider to the CDN or data centre and from the IAP1 to the CDN have the same 
thickness. The monetary transfer from the content provider to the CDN depends on the 
amount of data transferred through the CDN thus the monetary transfer is thicker than 
the traffic transfer between CP and CDN. In addition, the usage information transfer 
from the CDN or data centre to the CP depends on the amount of traffic requested from 
the CDN or data centre and thus the I2 transfer arrows have the same thickness as the 
content request traffic transfers. 
The traffic flow through the Internet backbone is quite similar to the client-server 
case. However, because the Internet backbone is used only by consumers with high 
tolerance of latency, the traffic volume is smaller than the traffic volume through the 
CDN. This also leads to the volumes of monetary transfers into the Internet backbone 
provider to be smaller than into the CDN from both of the Internet access provider and 
the CP box. As a consequence, the monetary transfer from the content provider to the 
data centre provider is thinner than in the client-server case. In addition, usage 
information transfer from the data centre to the CP is smaller. The red lines in Figure 9 
shows the lines that have become thinner compared to the client-server model due to the 
usage of a CDN. However, whether CDN is a feasible model for CPs depends on the 
difference between the amount paid to the CDN and the decrease in payments to ISPs. 
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Figure 9. Value network of a Content Delivery Network. 
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If the payments to CDN exceed the decrease in payments to ISPs, CPs incur more costs 
with CDN and thus it is not a feasible model financially. 
The traffic transfer from the content provider to IAP1 is thinner than in the client-
server case because the traffic transferred through the Internet backbone provider is 
smaller. However, the traffic between CP and IAP1 is thicker than the combined traffic 
between IAP1 and IBP, and IAP1 and consumer group 1 because traffic to the CDN 
may also be transferred through IAP1. The monetary transfer between CP and IAP1 has 
the same thickness as the corresponding traffic transfer. 
The traffic and monetary transfers between the two consumer groups and their 
Internet access providers are the same as in the client-server model because the access 
operators’ network size does not depend on the content distribution model. 
Costs 
The costs faced by content providers that use CDNs are discussed in this section. Just as 
for the client-server model, the references for the costs are the interview results in the 
previous section. When CDN is used, it does not really matter if the content provider is 
large or small: the cost structure is the same. 
As distribution costs are the greatest expenses for content providers, the fees paid to 
CDNs are the main contributor to the overall costs. Because the CDNs handle the 
content distribution, content providers do not have to take care of encoding, which cuts 
expenses. In addition, the content provider’s Internet capacity does not have to be 
considerable because the traffic amount between the IAP and CP is smaller due to the 
CDN. All these cost savings are reflected then in the CDN service prices. 
The rest of the costs are the same as in the client-server model. Infrastructure is 
needed, to a lesser extent, even if the actual content distribution is not handled by the 
content provider. Content still has to be produced and managed thus the same software, 
human capital and hardware costs exist. The developed content has to be marketed and 
the distribution right has to be bought from the copyright owners. 
5.4 Information Networking 
Out of the three information networking architectures, the CCN architecture is designed 
as an overlay to the basic IP network and can be best compared with CDNs. Thus the 
CCN’s value network is produced in this section and shown in Figure 10. 
The value network of the CCN is practically the same as for the client-server model. 
The traffic and monetary transfers all stay the same as well apart from changes in 
thickness. The only difference is the addition of cache servers located within the 
Internet access providers, the Internet backbone provider and the network. Due to these 
cache servers, not all requests go all the way to the origin server of the content but may 
be answered already by one of the caches. 
When the content is first requested, the IAP and IBP forward the request to the 
content provider and the content is replied from either the content provider’s own 
servers or rented servers. When the content flows through the Internet access provider, 
the Internet access provider’s cache server stores this content for the predetermined time 
period, after which it is deleted. The same caching process is done by all the caching 
servers that the content passes en route to the consumer. The next time the same content 
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Figure 10. Value network of a Content Centric Network. 
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is requested, one of the cache servers may directly reply to the consumers if the validity 
period has not expired. 
In addition, in CCN, the consumers may act as servers and send each other the 
content requested. However, this is not shown in Figure 10 as all this traffic would still 
go through the Internet access provider and maybe even through the backbone network. 
Weighted Value Network 
The weighted traffic is mainly the same as with the client-server model with only a few 
differences shown as red lines in Figure 10. The first difference is the traffic transfer 
between the content provider and IAP1, which has the same thickness as the amount of 
content produced in the CCN model and not the sum of the two traffic transfers between 
consumers and IAPs. This is because once all the content has gone through IAP1 once, 
the content are stored in the cache server and replies to the rest of the requests directly 
from the cache. 
As a result of lower traffic between the IAP1 and content provider, the content 
provider also pays less to IAP1 for Internet access. In Figure 10 this can be seen from 
the thickness of the monetary transfer, which is as thick as the traffic transfer between 
IAP1 and the content provider. 
The second difference is the amount of traffic going through the Internet backbone 
provider. Due to the cache servers, the traffic going through the IBP has the same 
thickness as the amount of content produced instead of the traffic generated by 
consumers 2 as is the case in the client-server model. As a consequence of reduced 
traffic through the IBP, the content provider also pay less to the data centre. In addition, 
the amount of usage information gathered by the data centre is also smaller; only the 
first requests of contents is recorded as the rest of the requests do not go all the way to 
the data centre. 
The difference between the CCN and CDN models is in the thickness of the red 
lines shown in Figure 10. In CCN, the red lines will have the same thickness regardless 
of how much more content is requested by consumers 2 while in CDN the traffic going 
through the IBP increases with the amount of consumer requests. In addition, the traffic 
between the CP and IAP1 is thinner in CCN compared to CDN’s case. 
Costs 
The cost types faced by the content provider in the CCN model are most likely the same 
ones as in the client-server model. The difference may be in the volume of the costs. 
From the above value network analysis, it can be seen that at least the Internet access 
costs are lower in the CCN model than in the client-server model. 
However, if the IAPs have adopted the cache server, the installation costs and the 
extra maintenance costs may be reflected on the Internet access prices charged to the 
content provider. On the other hand, it is also possible that the lowered traffic between 
the IBP and the IAP lowers the costs for the IAPs, which compensates for the cache 
server costs. In this case, the Internet access price for the content provider may not rise. 
The content providers may also be willing to invest in the cache servers to be 
placed in the network, which will add to the hardware costs that the content provider 
faces. In addition, maintenance costs will arise from having the cache servers. 
Because content is cached locally and may be found anywhere in the network, the 
network requires a mechanism to map requests to the data. It may be a third party that 
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offers this service and it is possible that the service provider charges the content 
provider for the service. In addition, usage statistics on each piece of content, now 
provided by the CDN, are required by the content providers and advertisers also in the 
case of information networking. It also may be a third party that provides this service 
and the content providers may be charged for the service. This third party, however, is 
not shown in the value network and in information networking, collecting usage 
information may be impossible. 
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6. Content Delivery as Two-sided Markets 
The different ways of distributing content have been identified in the previous sections 
along with the two-sided market theory. This section combines the distribution models 
with the economic theory by first identifying the different two-sided markets in each 
content distribution model. The identified two-sided markets are then categorised into 
content and Internet interconnection layers. Lastly, for each distribution model a cost 
analysis is performed on the two-sided markets of the Internet interconnection layer. 
6.1 Identification 
This section tries to identify the most significant two-sided markets of the client-server 
model, CDN and information networking regardless of whether they belong to the 
content layer or to the Internet interconnection layer. The identification is based on the 
value networks presented in Section 5. Because the whole value network is complex, 
the identified two-sided markets only take into consideration a limited piece of the value 
network. 
6.1.1 Client-Server 
The client-server model has mainly two two-sided market platforms; the content 
provider and the Internet service providers. The content provider has two two-sided 
markets and the ISPs have three two-sided markets. Each of them will be discussed here 
briefly, starting from the content provider’s two-sided markets. Table 3 shows all the 
two-sided markets found in the client-server model, where the loss leader is shown with 
the asterisk (*) sign. Table 3 also shows the platform of each two-sided market and 
presents a name to each for easier referencing. 
 
Table 3. Two-sided markets found in the client-server model 
Platform Side 1 Side 2 Name 
Content Provider Consumers* Advertisers Advertising market 
Content Provider Consumers* Content Makers Content Provision Market 
Internet Access 
Provider On-net Consumers Off-net Consumers* On-net vs. Off-net 
Internet Backbone 
Provider Consumers* Content Providers ISP Market 1 
Internet Backbone 
Provider Content Providers* Content Makers ISP Market 2 
Content Maker Consumers* Sponsors Sponsorship market 
 
Advertising Market 
The first two-sided market of content providers is between the consumers and 
advertisers. It is assumed here that the content providers bear some costs from 
producing or distributing the content. The interviews have showed that content is 
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mainly distributed free of charge to the consumers. Thus the advertising revenue model 
is used, which forms a two-sided market. The advertisers pay for the advertising space 
or time offered by the content providers while the consumers use the content for free. 
The only cost that consumers face is the time lost due to the advertising. 
Content Provision Market 
The second two-sided market of content providers is between the consumers and 
content makers. Here, it is assumed that the content makers are not the same actors as 
the content providers. In addition, the assumption that distribution of content incurs 
costs to the content provider is still valid. In this two-sided market, the content 
providers do not get any payments from the consumers, because the potential content 
fees all go to the content makers. The content providers’ revenue is raised through the 
content distribution fees charged from the content makers. This fee can be a royalty 
based payment from each content piece distributed or it can be a fixed fee for using the 
service. For example, application stores for mobile handsets offer a platform for 
consumers and application makers to meet. The consumers pay the application makers 
for the applications and the application store receives a cut from this payment. 
On-net vs. Off-net 
Based on the interview, it can be seen that traffic within one operator (on-net) and 
traffic between several operators (off-net) have different costs. This is due to the transit 
and peering agreements. Because the marginal cost of on-net and off-net are different 
for an Internet access provider, it should charge the consumers differently based on 
whether the traffic stays within the operator or needs connection to another operator. 
However, consumers pay the same flat rate fee to the Internet access provider. 
Assuming that off-net traffic exists, this means that consumers are paying a price 
between the on-net price and off-net price for all their traffic, be it on-net or off-net. The 
two-sided market following this assumption has Internet access providers as the 
platform. The two-sides are the on-net and off-net traffic; this basically means that the 
consumers mainly having on-net traffic is subsidising the consumers who have a lot of 
off-net traffic. 
ISP Markets 
Laffont et al. (2003) argue that the marginal cost of the originating traffic Internet 
backbone operator is different from that of the receiving backbone operator. 
Specifically, Laffont et al. (2003) write that it is cheaper to send traffic than to receive 
traffic from an Internet backbone provider’s perspective. This is because the operators 
have the incentive of passing on off-net traffic as soon as possible due to hot potato 
routing (Ben-Dor, Halevi and Schuster, 1998) and the transportation costs are mainly 
borne by the receiving Internet backbone operator. Due to this asymmetry in marginal 
costs, the Internet backbone providers should charge the Internet access providers, who 
in turn should charge the consumers more for receiving traffic compared to sending 
traffic. However, the consumers pay the same amount regardless of the traffic type; i.e. 
upstream or downstream. This is another reason why two-sided markets exist. 
The first two-sided market having the Internet backbone operator as the platform is 
between the content providers and consumers. Both the content provider and the 
consumers pay a flat rate fee to the Internet access providers for a certain level of 
service regardless of the traffic type. In reality, the traffic is mainly upstream on the 
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content providers’ side and downstream for the user. This would suggest that the 
consumer should pay more for the connection. However, this is not the case, which 
means that the marginal costs of transportation is indirectly borne by the content 
provider and the consumer benefits from this flat rate pricing. 
A second two-sided market also follows Laffont et al.’s reasoning: the Internet 
backbone provider is the platform and the two sides are the content makers and content 
providers. The Internet connection between them is mainly upstream at the content 
maker’s side and downstream at the content provider’s side, though they pay the same 
amount for the Internet connection between them. This two-sided market cannot be seen 
from the value networks because for simplicity, a direct link from the content maker to 
the content provider is drawn. However, it is highly probable that the traffic actually 
goes through at least an Internet access provider if not also through an Internet 
backbone provider. 
Sponsorship market 
In addition, the content maker can also be a platform when content makers do not 
handle content distribution themselves but rather use a content provider’s services. In 
this case, the two sides of the market are sponsors and consumers. The costs from 
making the content and paying the content provider are covered with sponsorships. The 
sponsors pay the content makers for brand visibility for their products. The consumers 
are assumed to have access to most of the content for free, thus becoming a loss leader. 
6.1.2 Content Delivery Network 
Because the Content Delivery Network is an overlay of the basic Internet, it also has all 
the same two-sided markets as the client-server model shown in Table 3. In addition, 
Faratin (2007) has recognised one more two-sided market in the CDN model between 
the content provider and the Internet access provider. Table 4 shows all the two-sided 
markets found in the CDN model, where the asterisk (*) sign marks the loss leader of 
each market and the cells with grey background marks the two-sided markets specific or 
the CDN model. The platform and the naming of each two-sided market are also shown 
in Table 4. However, only the CDN market is discussed in this section to avoid 
repetition. 
CDN Market 
In this two-sided network, the CDN provider is the platform. The Akamai versus 
Inktomi (Faratin and Wilkening, 2006) fight over the CDN business dominance has 
proved that it is more feasible to charge the content providers for the service rather than 
the Internet service providers. In the Akamai versus Inktomi case, Akamai charged the 
content providers while Inktomi charged the ISPs and in the end, Akamai won the 
competition. Thus, the loss leader in the CDN two-sided market is the Internet service 
provider and the revenue side is the content provider. 
6.1.3 Information Networking 
Because the Content Centric Networking architecture has the same stakeholders and 
traffics as the client-server model, the two-sided markets in information networking are 
also the same. These two-sided markets are shown in Table 3 of the client-server section. 
However, information networking exists only on a prototype level and not all 
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functionalities are developed yet thus it is possible that new two-sided markets in 
information networking may still emerge. 
 
Table 4. Two-sided markets found in the CDN model. 
Platform Side 1 Side 2 Name 
Content Provider Consumer* Advertisers Advertising Market 
Content Provider Consumer* Content Makers Content Provision Market 
Internet Access 
Provider On-net Consumer Off-net Consumers* On-net vs. Off-net 
Internet Backbone 
Provider Consumer* Content Providers ISP Market 1 
Internet Backbone 
Provider Content Providers* Content Makers ISP Market 2 
Content Maker Consumers* Sponsors Sponsorship Market 
CDN Provider Internet Access Provider* Content Provider CDN Market 
6.2 Categorisation 
The two-sided markets found in the previous sections can be categorised into the 
content layer and the Internet interconnection layer. The categorisation of the two-sided 
markets is made in this section. Before the two-sided markets are categorised, the two 
layers needs to be explained. 
Figure 11 shows the two layers with examples from each layer. The figure is 
positioned in an end-to-end manner; at the two ends are the consumers and content 
providers. The drawings between the two ends represent the network with its services 
and stakeholders. The content layer consists of the application and service providers, 
such as online content stores and video streaming applications. The Internet 
interconnection layer includes the basic Internet and all overlay networks used for 
content distribution. Some examples of overlay networks are the CDN and peer-to-peer 
networks. 
The categorisation of the two-sided markets is shown in Table 5. The content layer 
consists of content providers and content makers as platforms. The Internet 
interconnection layer includes the Internet access and Internet backbone providers as 
platforms. The CDN platform is categorised into the Internet interconnection layer as 
well. 
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Table 5. Categorisation of the two-sided markets in the content distribution market. 
Layer Name 
Content Advertising Market 
Content Content Provision Market 
Internet On-net vs. Off-net 
Internet ISP Market 1 
Internet ISP Market 2 
Content Sponsorship Market 
Internet CDN Market 
6.3 Analysis 
The previous sections identified and categorised the two-sided markets found in the 
three content distribution models. In this section, a two-sided market analysis will be 
made. The main focus of this work has been on the Internet interconnection layer and 
the analysis made in this section has the same scope. However, though the two-sided 
markets in the content layer are not discussed, they may affect the future market 
structure of content delivery. This section is divided into the different two-sided markets 
of the Internet interconnection layer because most of the two-sided markets are common 
in all of the content distribution models. The two-sided analysis will first explain the 
reasons why the two-sided markets have emerged and continue onto finding the impact 
that they have on the content distribution market. 
The following two-sided market analysis considers only the costs and traffic 
between the players in question and is not taking into consideration the whole value 
network. For example, the content provider most likely pays the Internet access 
provider for its Internet connection to the whole network. However, in each two-sided 
market, only the cost of a certain link is taken into consideration, so the overall Internet 
connection cost of the content provider is divided into the cost for connecting with the 
consumers, the data centre and the content maker. 
6.3.1 On-net vs. Off-net 
From the four two-sided markets, the Internet access provider platform with on-net and 
off-net traffic users on the two sides can be argued to not be a proper two-sided market. 
This is because the consumers producing the on-net and off-net traffic can be the same 
ones. However, in this work, consumers who produce more off-net traffic than on-net 
traffic are assumed to be the off-net consumers while the ones producing more on-net 
than off-net traffic are on-net consumers. Following this assumption, a valid two-sided 
analysis on this market can be made. 
The platform in this market is recognised as the Internet access provider. Tier 1’s 
are not included because they do not pay for their off-net traffic since all traffic is 
handled with peering agreements with other Tier 1’s. 
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Figure 11. Content and Internet interconnection layers with examples from each. 
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Causes of On-net vs. Off-net 
In this market, the same price is charged from both the on-net and off-net traffic 
producers. However, the on-net traffic has zero marginal cost while off-net traffic is 
costly for the Internet access provider to deliver because the Internet access provider has 
to pay the Internet backbone provider for the interconnection to another operator’s 
network. It is because of this asymmetry in marginal costs that the two-sided market 
arises. 
The asymmetry in marginal costs means that the on-net traffic producers pay a 
higher price than the price determined by the marginal costs. On the other hand, the off-
net traffic producers may have a price lower than the price based on marginal costs of 
delivering off-net traffic. This means that the off-net traffic producers are being 
subsidised while the Internet access providers gain revenue from the on-net traffic 
consumers. 
The pricing decision according to classical economics theories should be based on 
the elasticities of the two sides. Given that the off-net traffic consumers are being 
subsidised, they are likely to have more price elastic demand compared to the on-net 
traffic consumers. However, it is more likely that the pricing is the same for both sides 
because consumers prefer flat rate pricing and have no interest in knowing where the 
other endpoint is located. 
Impact of On-net vs. Off-net 
The main reason why two-sided pricing is practiced is to increase the willingness of the 
unsubsidised side to pay. This is because the subsidised side’s demand increases with 
the subsidy, which should be perceived as value added to the other side. However, this 
is not the case with the on-net vs. off-net market as the value on-net traffic producers 
perceive will not increase if more off-net traffic consumers joined the network. Some 
consequences do follow from the two-sided pricing and are discussed next. 
Looking purely from an economics theory point of view, the main consequence of 
subsidising off-net traffic producers is that they will produce even more off-net traffic 
and that on-net producers will also start to produce off-net traffic. This will lead to more 
off-net traffic and less on-net traffic, which causes higher costs and lower profit to the 
Internet access providers. If the costs of IAPs rise too high, they might want to limit the 
amount of off-net traffic or establish more peering agreements with other IAPs. In 
addition, IAPs may also raise prices for all consumers to cover the rising costs and 
declining profit. 
In addition, with the decrease of on-net traffic, the market may lose its two-
sidedness and become a one-sided market. Together with the rising prices, the IAPs 
with the highest costs may lose consumers and eventually some IAPs may go out of 
business. Alternatively, the IAPs may not be able to pass on the higher costs onto 
consumers so the revenue does not cover costs and thus go out of business. 
Thus from an Internet access provider’s point of view, the increasing of off-net 
traffic has a negative effect and they should change the current pricing policies. 
However, consumers prefer flat rate pricing with Internet as the size of each bill is 
predictable (Herweg, 2010). This could mean that the traditional Internet hierarchy and 
the transit and peering agreements may not be the best system for Internet 
interconnectivity. Some alternatives may have to be designed to replace the 
transit/peering connections. 
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However, looking at the Internet growth statistics, on-net traffic has grown with a 
much higher rate than off-net traffic, which may suggest that the on-net vs. off-net 
market is not two-sided after all. 
6.3.2 ISP Markets 
The platform in this two-sided market is the Internet backbone provider. The two-
sidedness is based on the assumption (Laffont et al., 2003) that the traffic originating 
(upstream) and terminating (downstream) backbone operators face different costs. A 
thorough explanation is provided next. 
Causes of ISP Markets 
According to Laffont et al. (2003), the receiving operator bears most of the costs of 
delivering the traffic. In the case of content sharing, the content provider mainly has 
upstream traffic while the consumers have downstream traffic. Because the platform is 
the Internet backbone provider and the consumer group 1 has only on-net traffic, only 
the consumer group 2 is considered. The assumption that each customer pays the same 
amount for the same level of service still holds in this market, though the consumers 2 
should pay more than the content providers according to Laffont et al. This means that 
the consumers 2 are being subsidised while the content providers generate revenue to 
the Internet backbone provider. 
The two-sided pricing practice seems to be reasonable as consumers are most likely 
more sensitive to price changes than the content providers are because consumers have 
less disposable income. In addition, the increase in consumer volume leads to higher 
value for the content providers as will be explained in the next section. 
Another two-sided market following the Laffont et al.’s assumption is between the 
content makers and content providers and also has IBP as the platform. In this two-sided 
market, the content makers develop content and send it to the content provider. No 
traffic moves from the content provider to the content makers and because no other 
links are considered, the content provider is the receiving party in this two-sided market. 
Following this reasoning, the content providers are being subsidised in this market. 
In this two-sided market, it is not clear which side has higher price elasticity of 
demand and which one is less elastic. Thus the two-sided pricing in this market may be 
purely because the same price should be charged for the same level of access service 
regardless of the marginal costs. 
Impact of ISP Markets 
By subsidising the consumers, the consumers perceive more value from the connection 
thus the Internet backbone provider may have more traffic in its network. If more 
consumers want to use the backbone access, IAPs may gain more subscriptions or the 
existing consumers may generate more traffic. As a consequence, the content providers 
may gain more clients or more advertising revenue, which may lead to more profit. 
However, when the Internet access providers’ off-net traffic increase, it follows the 
same analysis as in the on-net vs. off-net two-sided market. 
If content providers only gain more clients without more profit, the content makers 
may wish to produce more content to meet the higher demand. More content in turn 
might attract more content users and thus more consumers for both the Internet service 
providers and the content providers. With more consumers, the cycle begins again, 
which may continue until the market is saturated. 
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If content providers also gain more profit, the content distribution market may be 
perceived to be more attractive and thus new entrants may enter the market. In the 
second case, new content providers will continue to enter the market until the profit 
level has dropped back to the previous level. The larger amount of content providers 
will have mainly two effects. The first one involves content makers, who will have 
more choices on who can distribute their content, which may lead to the service fees 
declining with the increasing competition. When the service fees are lower, more 
content may be produced by the content makers and the same cycle as above is reached. 
The second effect concerns the consumers as will they have more choices on where to 
get the content. 
As a conclusion it can be said that the two-sided pricing in this two-sided market is 
beneficial for the Internet backbone providers as they will reach higher Internet 
penetration. In addition, decreased load on single links is also positive for the Internet 
backbone providers. For the Internet access providers, the situation may be the opposite 
due to the increase of off-net traffic and the potential threat of going out of business. 
When the content provider is subsidised in ISP market 2, more content providers 
may enter the market because the new entrants may perceive more value in the content 
provision market. As more content providers enter the market, the effect it has on the 
market is the same as in ISP market 1. The content makers and consumers will have 
more choices of content providers. The same conclusion is reached as in ISP market 1. 
6.3.4 CDN Market 
This two-sided market has the CDN as the platform. The two sides of the market are the 
content providers and the Internet access providers, who represent the consumers. The 
use of CDNs is beneficial for both the content providers and the Internet access 
providers. The content providers do not need to worry about content distribution or 
scalability. The Internet access providers pay less transit fees to the Internet backbone 
providers because part of the traffic is distributed by the CDN rather than through the 
Internet backbone. 
Causes of CDN Market 
This two-sided market is so far the clearest as different prices are charged from the two 
sides. The skewed pricing can be seen clearly in Figure 9, where the content provider 
pays the CDN for the service while no money is flowing between the Internet access 
providers and the CDN. In addition, the CDN may even offer free peering points into its 
backbone network to IAPs. Keeping in mind that both the content provider and the IAPs 
benefit from the CDN’s services, the pricing can be described as two-sided. In this two-
sided market, the content providers generate revenue for the CDNs while IAPs are 
being subsidised. 
From the Akamai vs. Inktomi case it can be deduced that charging the content 
providers is more profitable than charging the Internet access providers as Akamai 
succeeded in capturing market share while Inktomi did not. This may mean that the 
content provider has relatively lower price elasticity of demand than the Internet access 
providers. 
Impact of CDN Market 
The lack of monetary transfer between the CDN and the IAPs are compensated by the 
intangible network effects between the two. This means that if the IAPs have large 
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networks, the CDN will indirectly gain more value from being connected to the IAP. 
Vice versa, if the CDN is large and has lots of content, the IAP would gain more value 
from connecting to it. This is due to the existence of positive externalities. Externalities 
are the basis for network effect and the positive network effect between the CDN and 
the IAP will cause the CDN to grow until only one CDN is dominant in the market. 
In addition, when a CDN subsidises IAPs, it will be connected to more IAPs, so it 
has a better reach to the consumers. All content providers want to be connected to the 
CDN with the largest reach of consumers. As a consequence, both more content 
providers and more IAPs connect to this CDN. The CDN may then grow into a natural 
monopoly or at least a few large CDNs will dominate the market. 
When a monopoly exists in a market, mainly two outcomes can occur; one positive, 
the other negative. The positive outcome involves the monopoly gaining economies of 
scale and thus having lower marginal costs. When marginal costs are lowered, the 
monopoly CDN may lower its prices to reach economic efficiency. On the other hand, a 
monopoly has the power to set prices as it has no competition; thus a monopoly CDN 
may raise prices. However, the more likely outcome is an oligopoly situation with a few 
large CDNs dominating the market because the government policies tend to prevent 
monopolies from forming. The large CDNs may also gain economies of scale and due 
to the existence of competition, no one can raise prices. 
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7. Comparison of Content Delivery Models 
The previous sections identified the content distribution models as well as analysed 
them with two-sided market theory. This section will make a comparison of the three 
models; client-server, CDN and CCN. In addition, the feasibility of the models is 
examined. Lastly, the future of the content distribution market is discussed. 
7.1 SWOT Analysis 
This section compares the three content distribution models using the SWOT analysis 
method. SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) (Johnson, Scholes and 
Whittington, 2005) analysis summarises the key capabilities of a company or 
organisation and key issues from the market environment to determine the 
organisation’s competitiveness. This work attempts to identify the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats of content distribution models. Because no single 
company or organisation exists for Internet content delivery models, the analysis is done 
from each model’s perspective. 
7.1.1 Client-Server 
Table 6 shows the SWOT analysis of the client-server model. Some of the strengths of 
client-server include reliability of hardware, relatively low deployment prices for the 
content providers compared to the CDN, for example, and availability to everyone 
connected to the Internet. However, the weaknesses are lack of service quality 
guarantees due to the best-effort nature of the IP Internet, which include delays and 
packet losses. In addition, large and popular content may cause a lot of traffic load 
around the origin server. 
 
Table 6. SWOT analysis of client-server. 
Strength 
 
- Basic infrastructure, available for 
everyone 
- Content providers have better 
control over where and who has 
access to the data 
- Relatively cheap 
- Reliable 
Weakness 
 
- End-to-end delay 
- Packet losses 
- Best-effort provides no QoS 
guarantee 
- Big and popular files cause large 
network load, especially on 
access networks 
Opportunity 
 
- May offer more services on top 
of the basic network 
Threat 
 
- May be replaced by overlays 
running on top of the basic 
network, such as CDN and P2P 
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Being a basic Internet architecture has its opportunities and threats, depending on 
how the situation is managed. The opportunity of client-server arises from network 
components offering additional services on top of the basic network. However, third 
parties, who wish to offer overlays such as CDNs or P2P networks presents a threat to 
the client-server model. 
7.1.2 Content Delivery Network 
The SWOT analysis made for CDN is shown in Table 7. Scalability and offering of a 
comprehensive service are some of the key capabilities a CDN has to successfully 
compete in the content distribution market. In addition, CDNs may offer service level 
guarantees in the form of service level agreements and the content provider’s access 
network is not strained because the traffic goes directly through the CDNs’ servers. The 
main weakness of a CDN is the high prices that it charges content providers for the 
service. Some other weaknesses include high traffic loads on links around the CDN 
server and the loss of perfect control of a content provider. 
The existence of network effects in the CDN market can be both an opportunity and 
a threat, depending on the size of the CDN. For a large scale CDN, the size may get 
even larger due to the network effect and this means gaining market share at the 
expense of smaller CDNs. As a consequence, one or a few major CDNs may see the 
opportunity to dominate the market while the smaller CDNs face a threat of going out of 
business. CDN as an architecture has the advantage of being an overlay, which 
functions on top of any network, may it be an IP network, Ethernet network or even 
PSIRP. 
 
Table 7. SWOT analysis of CDN. 
Strength 
 
- Scalable 
- Service level guarantees 
- Comprehensive service package 
- CP’s network not strained 
Weakness 
 
- Relatively expensive 
- CDN servers concentrate traffic 
around them, which strains the 
links connected to the servers 
- CPs cannot control where and 
who has access to the data 
Opportunity 
 
- Network effect may produce 
dominant CDN 
- As an overlay, works on any 
network; IP or something else 
Threat 
 
- Network effect may cause 
smaller CDNs to go out of 
business 
- Consolidation of CDN market 
may raise prices 
 
50 
 
7.1.3 Content Centric Network 
Table 8 shows the SWOT analysis of the Content Centric Network. Scalability is also a 
key capability for CCN in additional to being cheap and content centric instead of 
location centric. Content centric means also user friendly as the data chunks have 
meaningful names instead of addresses. In addition, the caches may lessen delay and 
congestion in the network. The only weakness of CCN is the lack of a mechanism to 
find data if no nearby caches are found. Flooding is used in CCN to find content but for 
finding a data piece that is located far away in the network, flooding may not be the 
most efficient method to find data and the network may become congested. 
 
Table 8. SWOT analysis of CCN. 
Strength 
 
- Scalable 
- Content centric 
- User friendly 
- Networks not strained 
- Less delay 
- Cheap 
Weakness 
 
- Flooding to find content may 
cause problems if no caches are 
found nearby 
- Less control 
- No simple means to collect 
usage data or other statistics 
 
Opportunity 
 
- CCN can work as an overlay, 
thus functions on any network 
- Reduced off-net traffic for IAPs, 
thus IAPs may be interested in 
investing 
Threat 
 
- No deploying incentive 
- PSIRP and other information 
networking architectures 
- Large enough CDN may offer 
the same level of service as CCN 
- Copyright protection; may or 
may not be managed well 
- Value not in transferring bits 
anymore, where is it then? 
 
CCN can also be understood as an overlay, which means it can function on any network. 
Like in the case of CDNs, this is an opportunity. However, if some content centric basic 
network architecture such as PSIRP is widely deployed, an overlay that functions with a 
similar concept may not be needed. Another threat includes a CDN becoming so widely 
connected that it offers the same level of services as a CCN would, thus making CCN 
obsolete. When the data is cached at the local ISPs and other cache servers, it is hard to 
manage the copyright protection unless each individual file is protected. This may be a 
big threat for the CCN. The threat of a new invention not being competitive enough for 
someone to invest in it always exists; this is also the case with CCN. However, as CCN 
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reduces off-net traffic for IAPs and does not change the basic IP architecture, IAPs may 
be interested in deploying caches. Lastly, the content centric concept may change the 
network so that the value does not come from moving the bits anymore thus it may take 
the revenue source from ISPs if they cannot think of other ways to charge the clients. 
This may lead to ISPs resisting the change into content centric. 
7.1.4 SWOT Comparison 
The results of the SWOT analysis are collected and the three models compared here. 
Some important criteria gathered from the SWOT analysis are presented in Table 9 
together with each distribution model’s standing with the criteria. In addition, an 
explanation of each criterion is given in this section. 
 Cost for CP – The price the content provider has to pay for the service. 
Low means less costs while high is for higher costs. 
 Cost for ISP – The price the ISPs have to pay for the service. 
 Scalability – How scalable the model is when more consumers use the 
service. Low means bad scalability while high stands for scalable. 
 Delay – The network delay that the packet faces when traversing in the 
network. Low delay mean small roundtrip time and high is large roundtrip 
time. 
 Network congestion – Network congestion criterion tells where if at all 
congestion exists in the network when many consumers are connected to 
the service and requesting for content. 
 Accessibility of service – Measures how accessible the data is. This 
includes the hardware and software operability as well as downtime 
guarantees and backup systems. 
 QoS levels available – Measures how much control does the content 
provider have on the quality of service level in each content distribution 
model. 
 CP’s Control over content – Measures how well the content provider can 
remove, update or modify content as well as get usage statistics. 
 Copyright protection – Measures how well the content providers can 
manage copyright issues. 
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Table 9. Comparison of the content distribution models based on the SWOT analysis. 
Criteria Client-Server CDN CCN 
Cost for CP Low High Low 
Cost for ISP Medium Low Medium/High 
Scalability Low High High 
Delay High/Medium Medium Low/Medium 
Network Congestion Around the central 
server 
Around CDN servers When flooding for 
non-cached item 
QoS Levels 
Available Low High Low 
Accessibility of 
Service High High High/Medium/Low 
CP’s Control over 
Content High Medium Low 
Copyright 
Protection High Medium Low 
 
From the SWOT analysis and the above comparison of results, a few conclusions 
can be drawn about the content distribution models: 
 The highest service fees that the content providers face is with the CDN, 
while in client-server and CCN no third party charges service fees from the 
content provider. CPs pay service fees to the Internet access provider in all 
three cases. 
 A content provider using the client-server model has lower degrees of 
scalability than a content provider using the CDN or CCN models due to 
server capacity constraints of servers owned by the content provider. A 
CDN may allocate dynamically more server capacity to the content 
provider when more clients use the service and for CCN, the content is 
cached nearer the consumers thus the origin server load is much smaller. 
 Delay in the client-server model may become high during the peak traffic 
hours for popular content. In CDNs the delay may also become a problem 
if the links to the CDN servers become crowded, but the CDN can have 
several CDN servers dedicated for certain high traffic areas. In a CCN, 
because the content is cached near the consumers and several sources may 
exist, the delay is of less a significant problem. However, for new content, 
some delay may arise when the network is flooded to find the data. Thus 
delay is the highest in the client-server model and lowest in CCN. 
 In the client-server model, usually a central origin server is used, from 
where all content the delivered. This is a source for congestion, especially 
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during peak hours. CDNs may have congestions near the servers as well but 
by locating servers containing the same content at different places, the risk 
of congestion can be reduced. With CCN, the content is cached anywhere 
in the network that it passes, thus the next requesters in the area may get the 
content from a local source. This reduces congestion considerably. 
However, during the content discovery face, the flooding may congest the 
network. Thus the client-server model has the highest congestion risks 
while the CCN has the smallest congestion risks. 
 When using the client-server model, the content providers have better 
control over the hardware and software of their distribution system thus the 
service is more reliable. CDNs offer service level guarantees thus they have 
backup servers to handle the distribution if the main servers fail. This 
means that the service should be quite reliable. The CCN uses cache servers 
for content distribution, which causes one significant problem; the content 
provider cannot control the cache servers. However, several sources of the 
same data should mean that the accessibility of the data is good. As a 
conclusion, the reliability of service for the client-server and CDNs are 
good while accessibility to data cannot be guaranteed with the CCN. 
 Due to the control over the data servers in the client-server model, the 
content provider also has control over who can access the content and from 
where. In the CDN, the content provider cannot control who has access to 
the data servers but a protection mechanism on each data file can be 
implemented. How well the file protection works depends on the 
algorithms. In addition, the CDN has contracts with CPs that can guarantee 
copyright protection. CCN relies solely on protection algorithms and 
copyright protection cannot be guaranteed. Thus copyright protection is 
best in the client-server model and CDN comes as a good second while in 
CCN, it may or may not be good. 
7.2 Comparison Summary 
So far the content distribution models have been analysed with the two-sided market 
theory and SWOT analysis. This section combines the interview results from Section 4 
and the SWOT analysis done in this section to form some conclusions on the prospects 
of information networking in the content distribution market. The conclusions are done 
from different stakeholder’s perspectives, starting from the content provider. 
Content Provider 
As the interviews have revealed, the most important feature of a content distribution 
system from a content provider’s perspective is the cost efficiency. This suggests that 
the CCN or the client-server is the best option for the content providers based on the 
service fees faced by them in each model. 
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The next important features for the content providers are scalability and reliability. 
From the two relatively low cost distribution models, CCN offers better scalability 
while in the client-server model better control over the service provision is achieved, 
which may result in better reliability. In terms of guaranteed QoS, CDN offers the 
highest QoS through Service Level Agreements (SLAs). 
For the smaller content providers, it is very important that no major upfront 
investments are made as their funding may be limited. Thus the CDN business model of 
monthly payments is ideal for the smaller content providers. In the CCN, the origin 
servers’ capacity and processing power may not need to be very significant as the 
content is cached into the network and only some traffic goes all the way to the origin 
servers. This means that the upfront investment in hardware and software may not need 
to be very high in CCN. 
The last feature on the importance list is the fast distribution of content. As can be 
seen from Table 9, the client-server model has the highest delay whereas the CDN and 
CCN have lower delays. However, the content providers regard low delay as the least 
important, thus it is only used if the other features are not enough to determine which 
distribution model is best suited for content distribution. 
From the above discussions it can be seen that the client-server model and the CCN 
are in a tie situation after considering the most important features. Taking into 
consideration fast distribution and low upfront investments for smaller providers, CCN 
ranks better than the client-server model. Thus it can be concluded that from the content 
providers’ perspective, CCN is the best alternative for content distribution. However, 
the low control of content and service level as well as unguaranteed reliability may limit 
the success of CCNs. In addition, for a content provider offering delay sensitive data, 
CDN should perform better in the comparison. 
Internet Access Provider 
In the interviews, it is mentioned that the client-server model may strain the access 
network. Assuming that the Internet access provider does not wish to have congestion in 
its network, it may be suggested that the client-server model is not the most ideal for the 
IAP. 
In addition, the Internet interconnection agreement principles have pointed out that 
the Internet access providers prefer on-net traffic rather than off-net traffic. The 
interviews have showed that the growth of off-net traffic has slowed while the growth 
of on-net traffic is high. This may suggest that the IAPs have intentionally avoided off-
net traffic by maybe switching to architectures with less off-net traffic. 
From the three content distribution models, the CDN and CCN produce less off-net 
traffic than the client-server model. CDNs quite often have local CDN servers in highly 
populated areas, thus the traffic does not need to go to other operators’ network. In 
addition, a large CDN may have its own backbone network for content distribution and 
offer free peering points for IAPs thus no transit fees are paid, which is equivalent to not 
having off-net traffic. CCN produces some off-net traffic but for each piece of data, 
after the first request, the data will be stored in cache servers within the operator’s 
network and thus later requests do not generate off-net traffic. 
However, the interviews have also revealed that the main cost source is the energy 
consumption from server halls. In CCN, the IAPs would need to install and maintain 
cache servers, which consume more energy and thus add to the energy costs. It may 
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then be argued that a cost saving IAP may not want to deploy CCN and from the IAP’s 
perspective, the CDN is a better choice. On the other hand, if the extra energy 
consumption is compensated by savings in the off-net traffic costs, IAPs may want to 
invest in cache servers of the CCN model. 
Internet Backbone Provider 
An Internet backbone provider’s revenue arises from selling transit services thus if a 
model lowers IBP’s transit sales, the model may not be preferred by IBPs. Since a CDN 
with its own backbone network does not require the Internet backbone providers’ 
services, the IBP may not want CDNs to be used. In addition, in the interviews, it was 
mentioned that the CDNs may cause congestions in the network around the servers. 
Thus IBPs may not prefer CDNs to be used by the content providers. However, IBPs 
may enter the CDN market if revenue from selling transit lowers significantly. 
Similarly to IAPs, the major cost source the IBP faces is also from energy 
consumption. Thus IBPs may not want to increase this cost by installing and managing 
cache servers. However, from the interviews, it can be seen that the IBPs have 
considered caching and would be interested in deploying it if some challenges can be 
solved. 
Another large cost for IBPs arises from building the network thus IBPs may not 
want to create more infrastructure to meet the growing demands of network capacity. A 
solution could be to deploy CCN. However, if a network wide CCN is deployed, less 
transit services may be needed and thus the IBPs may suffer from it. 
For an Internet backbone provider, no clear preference for one content distribution 
model is formed. The best alternative depends on the respective cost savings and 
additional costs of deploying each model. 
Consumers 
For a consumer the content distribution model mainly has no effect. In each model, the 
consumer has to pay for Internet access to the Internet access provider and a possible 
content fee to the content provider. When the content is time sensitive, the consumer 
may want to have the least possible delay in the service. In this case, the CDN and the 
CCN can provide the best service for the consumer. However, during non-peak hours or 
for not so popular content, the client-server model may also provide delay free service. 
On the other hand, the IAP’s costs are more or less directly reflected on the consumers’ 
prices, thus it would suggest that the consumers prefer the same model as the IAP. 
Data Centre Provider 
A data centre provider rents out data servers to anyone who requires server capacity. 
The server can be rented to practically anyone: the content provider in the client-server 
model, the CDN service provider in the CDN model or as cache servers in the CCN 
model. Thus, for a data centre provider, it also does not matter which content 
distribution model is in use. 
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8. Conclusion 
This section presents the key findings of the thesis and discusses the limitations of the 
study and applications of the results. In addition, topics of future research are proposed. 
8.1 Key Findings 
On the general level, one of the key findings is that the current Internet cannot 
efficiently meet the increasing content volume and demand for network capacity. Thus 
modifications to the current Internet or entirely new Internet architectures must be 
designed and implemented. This work has discovered three future Internet suggestions 
that adopts the information networking concept – CCN (Jacobsen, 2009), PSIRP (Fotiou, 
Polyzos and Trossen, 2009), NetInf (Ahlgren and Vercellone, 2010) – and one 
modification to the current Internet (network wide CDN). 
The interviews indicate that CCN and NetInf are designed as overlays for the 
current Internet while PSIRP is the only clean-slate Internet architecture suggestion. A 
closer look on CCN was taken in this work by comparing CCN and CDN as the two 
models can substitute each other on the conceptual level. 
The two-sidedness of the content distribution market may increase off-net traffic, 
which is unfavourable for the Internet access providers (IAP), who wish to reduce the 
amount of off-net traffic. The performed value network analysis indicates that the CCN 
model reduces off-net traffic, especially for the Internet access providers. This finding 
may be the only business case for information networking as IAPs may be willing to 
invest in cache servers if they benefit from the investment. However, the exact amount 
of benefit from reduced off-net traffic can only be determined after taking into 
consideration the initial investment and the relative increase in energy consumption 
costs. In addition, a network wide CDN with servers within each IAP’s network should 
have the same effect on off-net traffic as the CCN. 
The two-sided market analysis suggests that as a result of the two-sided pricing in 
the Internet interconnection, more content providers may emerge in the market and the 
Internet backbone providers’ network may reach wider connectivity. In addition, the 
two-sided pricing in the CDN market may cause one CDN to become a monopoly or 
oligopoly, which may lead to a network wide CDN coverage. Following these 
conclusions, the qualitative two-sided analysis can be said to explain the current market 
structure. In addition, it may predict future market structure, the accuracy of which 
cannot be determined. However, two-sided analysis’ ability to compare different models 
in the qualitative level is not optimal. 
The SWOT analysis identifies the criteria to measure each content distribution 
model. Based on the criteria, each stakeholder’s preference of distribution models is 
derived. For the consumers and data centre providers, the content distribution model 
does not affect their market behaviour. IAPs prefer either the CDN or CCN whereas the 
IBPs’ preference could not be concluded with the available information. Lastly, the 
content provider prefers the CCN model. This finding means that the content provider 
may be willing to invest in the cache servers to be placed in the network. 
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8.2 Discussion 
This work analyses the two-sided market and value networks of content distribution 
models. In addition, the market demand for information networking is explored. In the 
process, many assumptions and simplifications are made to ease the analysis. However, 
in real life cases, these assumptions may not hold entirely since the real world 
relationships are much more complex. 
This work assumes that the content maker bears some costs for producing the 
content. However, with most digital products, the marginal cost of producing one more 
product is practically zero. In addition, content providers are assumed to bear costs from 
distributing content to consumers. This is only partly true as content providers do pay 
for having access to the Internet but they do not pay specifically for delivering the 
content to the consumer. These assumptions have enabled the two-sided market 
identification involving the content provider as a two-sided platform. 
The simplification that the consumers who produce mostly off-net traffic are off-net 
consumers is made. The same simplification applies for on-net consumers as well. 
Without these simplifications, the on-net and off-net consumers cannot be identified and 
thus the on-net vs. off-net two-sided market analysis would not be possible. Without 
separating on-net and off-net consumers, the two sides would have the same price 
elasticity of demand and intentional two-sided pricing cannot be practiced. 
This work has ignored the link asymmetry in access networks. In reality, the 
downstream link between the consumer and the Internet access provider has higher 
capacity than the upstream link. This asymmetry may in fact be the reason why the 
marginal costs of upstream and downstream traffic are also asymmetric apart from the 
hot-potato routing. However, taking into account the link capacity asymmetry does not 
necessarily change the two-sided pricing in access networks. 
The two-sided analysis in this work is limited only to the qualitative analysis due to 
the lack of quantitative data. For this reason, the two-sided analysis on the Internet 
interconnection layer is limited. In addition, limiting the two-sided analysis on the 
Internet interconnection layer and only the link between the players in question may 
have an impact on the results. For example, content providers act as platforms in the 
advertising and content provision markets and according to the two-sided market theory 
should predict consolidation of content providers. This opposes the conclusion of 
content providers increasing in number based on the Internet interconnection layer’s 
two-sided analysis. The comparison of the distribution models and their feasibility thus 
is mostly based on the SWOT analysis and value network analysis instead of the two-
sided analysis. 
This work has not aimed at finding or formulating business models for the CCN 
model. However, CDN’s two-sided market analysis has showed that content providers 
pay more willingly than ISPs for the service. This may also apply in the CCN case 
because it is basically a network full of local CDNs. On the other hand, no clear two-
sided market like the CDN market is found from the CCN model, which means that the 
CCN model does not have a platform that charges content providers or ISPs. In addition, 
the CDN provider provides intangible benefits to content providers in the form of usage 
information, which may be the reason why content providers are willing to pay for the 
service. The CCN model provides no such intangible benefits. This may mean that the 
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CCN model does not have business prospects and ISPs should consider getting into 
CDN business. 
Despite content providers’ preference for CCN, ISPs’ willingness to deploy CCN is 
more crucial as they control the network locations, where cache servers should be 
located. One potential platform could thus be the ISPs if they are willing to invest in the 
CCN deployment. ISPs then could either pass the extra costs onto consumers or content 
providers. Since ISPs include both IAP and IBP, their separate willingness for extra 
investments is next discussed. 
IAPs’ willingness to deploy CCN can be determined by summing up the net benefit 
of reduced off-net traffic, extra investments and other costs. IBP’s willingness to add 
cache servers to its network, on the other hand, is not straightforward but the following 
reasoning provides some stimulus for IBPs to consider CCN. Due to the changes in 
network hierarchy and other reasons, the Internet transit prices have dropped 
significantly and is converging towards zero pricing for each Megabit per second (Mbps) 
(Norton, 2010b). Since transit revenue has traditionally been the major income for IBPs, 
now IBPs are shifting to other revenue sources such as providing CDN services 
(Labovitz et al., 2009). Thus IBPs may be open to the possibility of finding viable 
revenue models from CCN services. 
8.3 Future Research 
This work has presented a qualitative analysis of the two-sided markets as well as a 
comparison of content distribution models. The next step would be to apply 
mathematical formulation to each model and to find quantitative data on each 
stakeholder’s costs, prices and willingness to pay for the cache servers. However, 
companies may be reluctant to share detailed information on their costs and pricing. 
Thus methods to estimate quantitative data need to be formulated. 
The profitability of two-sided pricing depends largely on the existence of network 
externalities and thus network effect. The size of the network effect cannot be easily 
quantified although this information would be beneficial for the price setters. In addition, 
the extent of the price discrimination and whether the two-sided pricing in a two-sided 
market is stable depends on the respective price elasticity of each side. Thus it would 
also be interesting to estimate the price elasticity of different stakeholders. 
The CCN model is concluded to be preferred by content providers; however, 
whether it is deployed depends on ISPs’ willingness to invest in cache servers. Thus 
different business models for ISPs to profit from the extra investment are important and 
research on this subject should be conducted. 
The scope of this work is limited to include only the client-server, CDN and CCN 
models because content providers prefer client-server and CDN. Other content delivery 
models such as the cloud and peer-to-peer are also interesting research topics thus the 
research scope can be expanded to include them. In addition, a feasibility analysis can 
be performed on PSIRP and NetInf once more technical details are known of the 
architectures. 
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Appendix A – Mathematics of 2SM 
A.1 Monopoly platforms 
Private Monopoly 
Total profit is price times the quantity demanded, thus the profit function in a private 
monopoly is: 
π = pB + pS – c DBpB DSpS, (A1) 
where (pB + pS - c) is the total price of both sides minus the marginal cost of producing 
one extra product. DB and DS are the demand of the two-sides; buyers and sellers. 
To find the maximum of a function, it is first differentiated and then set to equal 
zero. Eq. (A1) has two variables and thus to maximise profit, Eq. (A1) is partially 
differentiated with respect to both of the variables; pB and pS, separately: 
∂π∂p = 1p + p − c +
DpDp = 0 (A2) ∂π∂p = 1p + p − c +
DpDp = 0 (A3) 
Because both Eq. (A2) and Eq. (A3) are equal to zero, they can be set to be equal 
and by moving the terms around Eq. (A4) is formed. 
D′D = D′D (A4) 
Elasticity is the percentage change in quantity demand divided by the percentage 
change in price as shown below in equation form: 
Elasticity =
∆QQ ∆PP
C = dQdP PQ 
By substituting the demand and price terms of a monopoly platform, the elasticities 
of demand of buyers and seller, respectively, are formed and shown in Eq. (A5) and Eq. 
(A6). 
η = − pD′D  (A5) 
η = − pD′D  (A6) 
By inserting Eq. (A5) and Eq. (A6) into Eq. (A4) and moving the terms around, the 
price structure of a monopoly platform in terms of price elasticity of buyer’s and seller’s 
demand is reached and shown in Eq. (A7). 
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pη = p

η →  p

p = η

η  (A7) 
Ramsey Pricing 
Social welfare of a monopoly platform is the net surplus of all transactions on both sides, 
represented by VpDp and VpDp. 
W = VpDp + VpDp (A8) 
Social welfare is maximised by partially differentiating Eq. (A8) with respect to p 
and p, separately: 
∂W∂p = VD′ − DD = 0 (A9) ∂W∂p = −DD + VD′ = 0 (A10) 
Setting the two equations to be equal gives Eq. (A11). 
VD′ − DD = −DD + VD′ (A11) 
After simplification of Eq. (A11), the Ramsey price structure for cost allocative 
efficiency is found and shown in Eq. (A12): 
 
VD η

p = V

D η

p (A12) 
A.2 Competing Platforms 
The profit function of a platform i competing with other platforms is given by Eq. 
(A13). 
π" = +p" + p" − c,Q" (A13) 
Partially differentiating Eq. (A13) with respect to p" and p" and setting the two 
differential equations to be equal maximises profit. The differential equations are shown 
in Eq. (A14) and Eq. (A15). 
∂π∂p = Q1 + +p1B + p1S − c,
∂Q1p1B = 0 (A14) ∂π∂p = Q + +p + p − c,
∂Qp  = 0 (A15) 
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Setting the two equations to be equal gives Eq. (A16). 
∂Qp =
∂Qp = −
Qp + p − c , (A16) 
where Q is the transaction volume for platform 1: 
Q = dpD+b , + D.p/D+p, − D+b ,0 when p < p  (A17) Q = ddpD+b , when p  < p (A18) 
To prove that Q1 is differentiable at p = p  , both Eq. (A17) and Eq. (A18) is 
partially differentiated with respect to p and the resulting differentials are compared: 
Eq. (A17): ∂Q∂p = D
d 
2d − D. (A19) 
Eq. (A18): 
∂Q∂p = D
d 
2d − D.  
Because the differentials are the same, Q1 is differentiable at p = p . 
By partially differentiating Q1 at p = p  ≡ p and p = p  ≡ pwith respect to p gives: 
∂Q∂p =
∂d"p, pDp∂p  (A20) 
Setting Eq. (A19) and Eq. (A20) to be equal with Eq. (A16) and substituting the 
terms with the singlehoming index σ, the own brand elasticity of demand η1 and the 
elasticity of the seller’s demand η  gives the price structure of competing platforms 
shown in Eq. (A21): 
 
p + p − c = pη1 =
pη/σ →  p

p = η1

η σ (A21) 
A.3 Membership fees 
The net utility of a competing platform is given with Eq. (A22) 
U" = +b" − p",N" − c − γ", (A22) 
where b" is the buyer average benefit of receiving the service, p" is the per transaction 
mark-up for the buyer, c is the platform’s fixed cost per buyer and γ" is the buyer’s 
fixed usage cost. 
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For consumers to singlehome to platform i, the utility consumers gain from 
associating with platform i must be positive and greater than the utility from platform j. 
Thus the new transaction volume function is shown with Eq. (A23). 
N" = Pr+U" > max+0,  U#,, = d"+p, N, p , N ,= Pr +H+b" − p",N" − c − γ" H≥ maxI0, +b# − p#,N# − c − γ#J, (A23) 
Substituting N and N  with N" = D+p", N", = Pr K+b − p",N" > γL gives Eq. 
(A24). 
N" = N, N  = n"+p, p, p , p , (A24) 
The profit function now becomes: 
π" = p" + p" − cN"N" (A25) 
Partial differentiation of Eq. (A25) with respect to p" and p" maximises profit. By 
setting the two equations to be equal and substituting the own elasticity for buyer 
demand η1, cross elasticity for buyer demand η, own price elasticity for seller demand η and network elasticity for seller demand η;  into the differential, the price structure 
that takes into consideration fixed costs is obtained and shown in Eq. (A26). 
 
p + p − c = pη11 + η;  =
p
η + η+1 + η; ,  →  
pp = η1

η + η (A26) 
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Appendix B – Interview questions 
B.1 Questions for Content Providers 
- Which content distribution models have you considered and which one(s) do 
you use? (e.g. CDN, own server system, rented server system, cloud) 
- What was the decision based on? (e.g. cost, reliability, scalability, other reasons) 
- If you used CDN, which company did you use? 
o Is there a server within your premises or are you connected to the CDN 
via IAP? 
o When did you start to use CDN? 
- What business model do you use regarding CDNs? 
o Do you pay something to the CDN company? 
 Are you happy with the price level? 
o Are there non-monetary benefits moving either way? 
- What is the concrete technical and business interface between you and the CDN? 
- What do you think is the CDN’s business model? 
- What features of CDN are important? List the following in the order of most 
important first. 
o Scalability 
o Reliability 
o Fast distribution of content 
o No upfront investments 
o Flexibility 
o Other feature? 
- Is there anything missing from the CDN service? 
- Have you faced any problems with your current setup? (e.g. scalability, security 
issues, leak of important information, QoS, revenues not covering costs) 
- Are you happy with the service in terms of price vs. quality of service? 
- What kind of relationship do you have with advertisers? 
- What kind of costs do you face? Does it depend on which model you use? (e.g. 
software, hardware, servers/CDN fees, Internet connectivity, human resources, 
others) 
- How do you manage copyright issues? 
- Interviewees were asked to give comments on value networks drafts. 
Caching/Information Networking 
- Do you see it as an alternative or complement to the current services? 
- Would it change your content distribution model? 
 
B.2 Questions for Internet Service Providers 
- From an ISP’s perspective, does it matter, which content distribution model the 
content provider uses, i.e. CDN, own server system, rented servers, and cloud? 
o Cost wise? 
o Otherwise? 
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- Do you consider CDNs as competitors? 
- Do you have agreements with CDNs? 
o Is there monetary compensation moving in either direction? 
o Are there non-monetary benefits moving either way? 
- What is the concrete technical and business interface between you and the CDN? 
- From an ISP’s perspective, do you think CDN will continue to prosper? Or will 
some other model take over (e.g. P2P)? 
- What kind of costs do you face? (e.g. backbone connectivity costs, peering or 
transit agreements with other ISPs) 
- Interviewees were asked to give comments on value networks drafts. 
Caching/Information Networking 
- Do you currently do some form of caching? 
o Have you done it earlier? 
- Would you be interested to deploy content centric networking? 
- From an ISP’s perspective, what are the possible advantages and disadvantages 
of information networking? 
 
B.3 Questions for Content Hosting Companies/Data Centre Providers 
- How do you differ from CDN’s? 
o Technically? 
o From a business perspective? 
- What costs do you incur? (e.g. hardware, software, distribution costs) 
- What kind of agreements do you have with CP’s? 
o What is the concrete technical and business interface between you and 
the CP? 
o Do you charge by bit stored or with a flat rate? 
- Do you collaborate with the ISP’s? 
- Do content users get content directly from your servers or through the CP? 
o What kind of traffic network is there? 
- Have you considered becoming a CDN? 
- Interviewees were asked to give comments on value networks drafts. 
Information Networking 
- Would you consider content centric networking as competition or opportunity? 
o Would you switch to it? 
 
